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Síntesis 
 
 
Este estudio consiste en un análisis del impacto que diferentes tipos de noticias 
corporativas tienen sobre el rendimiento y el volumen de las acciones de capital 
a corto plazo, y como estas noticias afectan la percepción y decisiones  del 
inversionista. Las noticias corporativas fueron divididas en cuatro categorías: 
noticias financieras, noticias de marketing, noticias sobre los recursos humanos 
de la empresa y noticias de desarrollo e inversión. Un total de 302,440 
observaciones fueron analizadas durante un periodo que comprendió entre el 2 
de enero de 1998 al 30 de diciembre de 2000 (precios diarios de las acciones de 
capital, volumen de tráfico diario, rendimientos diarios del mercado de capital y 
cambios en dichas variables). Se recopilaron y analizaron 3,665 noticias 
corporativas para las compañías seleccionadas. Se utilizaron las bases de datos 
CRSP (Center for Research and Securities Prices) y Compustat para recopilar 
los datos del mercado de capital, información de los estados financieros de las 
corporaciones estudiadas y los precios y volumen de tráfico diarios de las 
corporaciones estudiadas. La base de datos EBSCO Business Complete fue 
utilizada para recopilar las noticas corporativas. En esta investigación se utilizó 
la metodología de Estudio de Eventos (Event Study) para medir el impacto que 
las noticias recopiladas pudieron tener sobre el rendimiento de las acciones de 
capital estudiadas. Del estudio se desprende, que dadas las restricciones 
impuestas, las dos categorías de noticias que más impacto tuvieron sobre el 
rendimiento de las acciones de capital fueron las Noticias de Marketing y las 
viii 
Noticias Financieras, tal y como se planteó en la hipótesis. En promedio estas 
dos categorías de noticias causaron un rendimiento anormal acumulado (CAR) 
de -0.0588 y -0.0156 respectivamente, al momento de emitirse la noticia. Los 
rendimientos anormales (AR) promedio para las Noticias Financieras fueron de -
0.0214 al momento de emitirse la noticia y para las Noticias de Marketing este 
rendimiento anormal fue de -0.0404. Las pruebas de la hipótesis nula H0 para 
ambos eventos dio un resultado diferente de cero, -2.01 para la categoría de 
Noticias de Marketing y -2.41 para la categoría de Noticias Financieras. 
 
En el estudio se repasa y  se discute la literatura relevante y se brinda un 
trasfondo teórico acerca de la Hipótesis de Mercados Eficientes, factores que 
afectan los precios de las acciones de capital, la psicología y prejuicios de  los 
inversionistas, Teoría de Señales (Signaling), “Noise Trading” y los supuestos 
principales de la Finanza Conductual (Behavioral Finance).   De esta manera se 
busca poder brindar un mejor entendimiento al lector sobre la relación que hay 
entre la información que recibe el inversionista y como esto puede afectar su 
percepción y proceso decisional al momento de tomar una decisión de inversión.  
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Abstract 
 
This study consists of an analysis on the impact  specific company related news 
have on the short term company stock return and volume, and how these news 
affect investors’ perceptions and behavior which should in turn, affects stock 
prices of the firm. Company news were divided into four categories: Financial 
News, Marketing News, Human Resources News and Investment and 
Development News. A total of 302,440 observations (daily stock prices, daily 
trading volume, daily market returns and changes in prices and volumes) were 
analyzed from January 2, 1998 to December 30, 2000. A total of 3,665 corporate 
news were analyzed for the selected companies. The CRSP and Compustat 
databases were utilized to collect the market and company’s fundamental 
information. The EBSCO Business Complete news database was used to collect 
the corporate news. The news collected were divided into four different 
categories and the event study’s methodology was used to measure their 
respective impact. The study uncovered that given the restrictions imposed, on 
average the two more important groups of specific company news, Financial and 
Marketing News, accounted for -.0156 and -.05 of the average cumulative 
abnormal return observed during the event date. The average abnormal return 
for these two categories was -0.0214 and -0.04049 respectively. On the test for 
the null hypothesis (H0) on both cases the result was different than zero, -2.016 
for the marketing news category and -2.413 for the financial news category.  
 
x 
At first the study gives a brief theoretical background about the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, Stock Prices, Investor Psychology and Biases, and Behavioral 
Finance, in order to understand better the relationship between the information 
supplied to investors and their behavior and perception.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
There are many factors that influence the price of a company’s stock in the 
financial markets, for example, the company’s dividend policy, company risk, 
expected returns, change in future interest rates, inflation, and many other macro 
and micro economical factors. But it is interesting to notice how the majority of 
these factors take a longer time to influence the price of a stock, than the time it 
would take company news, or “rumors” to influence it (Koretz, 1998). Different 
studies have mentioned a link between the release on new information or news 
about a company and changes in that company’s share price. Others have 
mentioned a prolonged effect of new information over stock prices, but no study 
read during the literature review for this study, has tried to measure what types of 
news affects stock prices, returns, trading volume and investors’ behavior the 
most. All the papers read on this issue are described and analyzed in the 
Justification and Literature Review part of this study further ahead. For these 
reasons and for the apparent impact that different types of news have over the 
short term stock prices of company stocks, it is indispensable to analyze this 
phenomenon. I will give a brief background on the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, 
and Behavioral Finance, and Investors’ Biases in order to better understand this 
study’s main problem, which will be stated later on.  
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Study Objectives 
 
The objective of this study is to determine what is the impact that information 
specifically news about a company, has on the stock price, return and volume. 
This issue has been investigated in part by different academic papers, but none 
of the research reviewed tried to measure the impact of specific news categories, 
to see which type of news have a greater impact over a company’s stock price, 
returns, trading volume as well as changes in investors’ behavior. It is expect that 
investors will give more or less importance to different types of news, depending 
on how the news affects their expected return. It would also be helpful to observe 
in the future which kind of news have a stronger and more prolonged impact over 
a company’s stock price and return. The study also comments on how it is viable 
that the average investor places more importance on recent news about the 
company stock, than it would give to fundamental or quantitative analysis. In this 
study ten stocks were chosen, all of high technology companies (tech-stocks), 
and the impact that news had over their respective stock prices and trading 
volumes was measured during the period of January 2 1998 to December 30 
2000, right in the boom of the Internet bubble. As stated before, the study tried to 
observe what type of news (Financial, R & D, Human Resources and Marketing) 
had a stronger impact on the company’s stock price and return, as well as 
investors’ trading behavior. In the last part of the study the impact of such news 
over the price-return of the stocks is quantified. 
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Justification 
 
It is considered important to study the relation between the news and the price in 
the market of the short term capital stocks for the reasons before mentioned. 
Several examples support this work and seem to indicate that indeed a relation 
between company news and changes in the prices and returns of the capital 
stocks exists. A study by Arthur D. Little Inc. in March of 1987 demonstrated that 
only 30% of the Money Managers interviewed used quantitative methods 
intensively to analyze if they would or wouldn’t buy a company’s stock; On the 
other hand, 70% of the money managers interviewed said to take more into 
account company news, the analysis of historical movements in the price of the 
capital stocks, or “technical analysis” (Fabozzi, 1999). Also under certain 
circumstances according to Scharfstein and Stein (1990): “…managers simply 
mimic the investments decisions of other managers ignoring substantive private 
information. Although this behavior is irrational from a social standpoint, it can be 
rational from the perspective of managers who are concerned about their 
reputations in the labor market”, causing the phenomenon called herd behavior. 
More recently, during the 90’s Internet bubble, it was evident how daily news on 
companies like Yahoo!, Amazon, America Online and other Internet related 
companies, affected their stock prices and the decision on the part of the investor 
on whether he/she should buy or sell the stock. It was clear that the value of 
these companies stocks was not based on fundamental analysis, but rather on 
investors expectations and how those expectations got swayed either way, 
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positive or negative, by the daily news these investors were receiving about 
these “tech stocks”.   
 
There are many examples of “rumors” or financial news that affected company 
stock prices during this period. One of these examples was during the month of 
November 1999, when a “rumor” surfaced on different financial news sources 
about the posibility of a America Online and Netscape merger. During this period 
the price of the stock of both companies rose even though the news was only 
that, a rumor, and the merger never materialized. The price of the stock of both 
companies fell when it was anounced that the merger was not goin to happen. It 
is clear that investors’ expectations were affected by the news provided and that 
they reacted by initially buying both stocks and later selling such company 
stocks. This “irrational” behavior on the part of the investors made stock prices as 
a whole, specially those of High-Tech companies (Tech Stocks), highly unstable 
and increased the prices of many company stocks to monumental proportions 
between 1998 and 2000.  
It should be noticed that during speculative bubbles such as the Internet bubble, 
prices as a whole rise, creating many success stories among investors. These 
stories bring more and more investors to try their “luck” in the market, as they 
imagine the same can happen to them. But in the long run the price of these 
company stocks could not keep on going higher and higher without been 
supported by the fundamentals of the firm, earnings and good business models, 
as stated by Dylan Tweeny in January 1999 on what proved to be a profetic 
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article (Tweeny, 1999). Investors seemed to realize that there was very little to 
support such prices and this realization on the part of investors seemed to trigger 
a crash in share prices by the end of 2000 as investors lost confidence and 
started selling their stock holdings.   
 
A good example was Yahoo! during this period. In January 29, 1998 Yahoo! 
stock price was $58, by January 12, 1999 Yahoo! stock price hit a high of 
$438.63. This price movement was not supported at all by the fundamentals of 
the firm, but rather , it was induced by the different information, rumors and news 
about future company endeavours, and mergers that never happened. All this 
influenced investors’ expectations, sometimes positively others negatively, about 
the company and its future. By December 2000, Yahoo! stock price was down to 
$25. During its peak Yahoo’s stock had a price earnings ratio of over 400, which 
speaks volumes of it overvaluation at the time.  
 
Another interesting and very documented example of how investors expectations 
can be affected by news, and how this affect the stock price of a company, can 
be observed when analysts announce the degrading or upgrading of their 
recommendations on a company stock. This event affects the stock price of a 
company eventhough the recommendation doesn’t provide previously 
unavailable facts about the situation of the company been analyzed. (Barber, 
Leahavy, Nichols, & Trueman, 2001) (Womack, 1996) (Desai & Jain, 1995) (Liu, 
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Smith, & Azmat, 1995) (Bjerring, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 1983) (Davies & 
Canes, 1978).  
 
Yet another example of how news affects investor behavior and company stock 
price occurs when it is announced that a company’s stock is to be included or 
removed from an important market index, for example the S&P 5001. It is 
documented that on the day of the announcement, the company stock to be 
included or removed from the index, suffers from abnormal volatility in price and 
volume (Dhillon & Johnson, 1991) (Beneish & Whaley, 1996) (Boyer, 1999). But 
the effect of the announcement is not only seen on the announcement date, but 
also in increases (when included to the index) in earning per share (EPS) 
forecasts and improvements in realized earnings (Denis, McConnell, 
Ovtchinnikov, & Yu ,2003). Many researchers explain that this increase in price is 
mainly due to index fund managers rebalancing their portfolio, therefore 
increasing the demand for the new stock to be added, resulting in an increase in 
price of the stock, that has nothing to do with the fundamentals of the company. 
 
It should also be taken into consideration the market opinions of experts on Wall 
Street. Even more, the so called “investment superstars” seem to also have an 
impact over investors’ expectations (Desai & Jain, 1995). We should take into 
account that the economic environment is really complex, and investors may be 
uncertain about where to invest and the consequences of their decision to invest 
in a particular stock. In these situations of high complexity and uncertainty 
                                                 
1
 Standard and Poor’s 500 Market Index 
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investors and decision makers in general, look for the advice and guidance of 
experts in the field (Morgan & Stocken, 2003).  On a curious anecdote, according 
to Anthony Bianco from Business Week, May of 1998, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Index (Dow Jones) had gained 65 points during the day and everything indicated 
another record close for the index. During that time a rumor leaked that Abby 
Joseph Cohen, Chief Strategist in Goldman Sachs2 during that time, had altered 
her market forecast from a bullish one (positive) to a bearish one (negative). 
When Cohen was reached for comments the Dow Jones had already dropped 60 
points. Cohen rectified the information and stated that she had not altered her 
market outlook. By the closing bell the index had recuperated, and closed 35 
points over the privious day’s closing average. The anecdote shows that even 
rumors of a so called expert, can have an impact on the market, and stock 
prices. Another more intricate case happened on March 1984. One of the most 
widely read features on the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) during that time was the 
“Heard on the Street” (HOTS) column, which was published daily. According to 
the WSJ, the HOTS column was designed to “inform readers of market 
developments affecting the price of individual stocks or group of stocks. The 
emphasis is on timeliness and on stocks with high interests for investors…” also 
according to the WSJ, the column “is meant to assure the widest possible 
dissemination of information important to investors”. On march 29, 1984 it was 
announced that R. Foster Winans, one of the authors of the HOTS column, had 
leaked in advance, information about the timing and the content in the 
forthcoming HOTS column to four stock brokers. He then shared the illegal gains 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that Goldman Sachs is one of the largest investment banks on Wall Street 
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obtained by acting on this information with the brokers. The Security Exchange 
Comission (SEC)3 filed criminal charges against them. They all were eventually 
convicted of fraud and conspiracy for taking part in a scheme of illigally profiting 
from market sensitive information. The fact that Foster Winans and the four 
brokers made illegal profits based on advanced information to be published in the 
column suggests that the information published on the column, and the column 
itself, has an impact on stock prices (Liu, Smith & Azmat, 1995). 
 
The source of the news, or better said where the news is released or published, 
also may have an impact over investors behavior and the price of the company 
stock. Huberman and Regev (2001) offer an interesting example in the Journal of 
Finance. They examined the case of EntreMed (ENMD), a biotechnology 
company. On their paper the authors reported how on May 3, 1998, in the New 
York Times, an article was released about a breakthrough in cancer research 
done by ENMD, the company which had the licensing rights to the breakthrough. 
They stated that the impact the release of the news, had on ENMD’s stock price 
was “immediate, huge and to a large extent permanent.”. The only problem with 
this was that the story had no new-news content because the substance of the 
story had already been published as a scientific piece in Nature, a scientific 
journal, more than five months earlier. Investments experts specialized on 
biotechnology companys follow the journal Nature, but not necessarily the 
regular public or the regular investors. When the news was released in Nature 
                                                 
3
 The SEC is the federal government agency in the United States that is in charge of regulating the financial 
securities market. 
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the price of the stock had a small reaction, a just price reaction, as experts 
perceived the new price should be . But when the news was “re-released” in the 
New York Times, a periodical publication with a much broader and not 
specialized audience than Nature the price of the stock jumped from $12.063 to 
$85 in just a matter of one trading day. The volume also rose by more than 1000 
times from the average daily volume of the stock, the day the news was re-
released in the Times, from 10,000 shares to 10,000,000 shares traded that day. 
The authors asserts that the enthusiasm shown by the general public induced a 
permanent rise in the share prices of the company, eventhough no new 
information had been presented. Even when the experiments could not be 
replicated by other laboratories, the price of the company’s shares still was more 
than twice the value ($24.875) they had before the released of the article by the 
New York Times. 
 
An interesting fact that should be taken into account is that the average investor 
(non institutional) bases his/her investment decision on the most readily available 
information, which most of the time they receive from news sources such as 
television, Internet, investment sites, etc., not necessarily on the analysis of 
fundamental data (Prechter, 2001) (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, 1992). These 
investors are driven to follow the information received from these sources, 
because they don’t have the adequate knowledge to analyze fundamental data, 
company prices, financial statements etc.. According to (Glaeser, 2004): “…the 
body of psychological evidence has documented that decisions are driven by 
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situational factors, such as framing, social influence, and default rules which are 
often ephemeral and unrelated to long-run well-being”. Not only this, but 
according to Shleifer and Summers (1990) uninformed investors may simply 
follow trends that they believe exists in stock prices, this trend chasing only adds 
to the volatility of the markets since these investors are unaware of the 
fundamental prices of the stocks they are buying, and can not stop trading since 
they don’t know if the stock is over or undervalued. As stated before, during a 
bull market there is an upward trend in the market, meaning that there are many 
success stories, rising stock prices, etc., and the information the media provides 
is also biased towards the positive side, inciting investors to keep a positive, 
bullish attitude and keep on buying stocks in the market, just based on the trend 
and the positive news. It’s like the saying during the Internet bubble that  many 
media sources echoed “You just can not lose in this market”.The uncertainty that 
generally exists in the market, specially during periods of speculative bubbles, 
such as the Internet bubble, can lead to different investors’ biases, herding, and 
many other  market-investor behavior phenomena that only add to the volatility of 
the stock market, more inflated prices and an ever increasing bubble. These 
different biases and market phenomena will be explain ahead in the literature 
review chapter.  
 
Some other documented examples of the impact of news are the earnings 
announcements and leverage changes in a company (Titman, 2002), and stock 
returns following profit warnings (Bulkley & Herrerias, 2002). To some extend 
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another example is observed in Westphal and Zajac (1998), where the authors 
state that conventional agency perspectives assume that stock market reactions 
to changes in CEO compensation mix reflect economic benefits from reduced 
agency costs4. The authors argue that market reactions may instead reflect 
benefits (or losses) resulting from symbolic actions that reduce uncertainty about 
CEO motives. So the perception investors have about news releases concerning 
CEO’s motives, may affect the performance of a company’s stock price.  
 
The relevance of this study is not only that it will try to measure the impact news 
have over stock prices, which as it can be seen this has been documented with 
different types of announcements, but that it will try to measure which types of 
news affects investors’ trading behavior the most, and therefore which type of 
news affect stock prices and returns the most. This can give a more complete 
and rounder idea to future investors, investment professional, and researchers as 
to what type of news affect more stock prices and how this can affect their 
respective stock returns. It is also relevant for the area of corporate finance, 
                                                 
4
 The dominant rationale behind the creation of links between management compensation and 
firm economic performance was established by Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 19764; 
Fama, 19804). According to agency theory, the separation between owners and managers (Berle 
& Means, 19324) provided an opportunity for managers to act in their own self interest. The 
central issue for agency theory is how to resolve conflict between owners and managers over the 
control of corporate resources (Jensen 19894). The theory argues that under conditions of 
incomplete information and uncertainty, which characterizes most business settings, two agency 
problems arise: adverse selection and moral hazard. These problems mean that fixed wage 
contracts are not always the optimal way to organize relationships between principals and agents. 
It is suggested that the use of contracts, which seek to allocate decision rights and incentives 
(Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 19944), will better align the interests of owners and managers. The 
primary device suggested by agency theory to achieve this alignment was CEO compensation 
(salary, bonus and stock options). By linking CEO compensation to the economic performance of 
the firm, it was hoped that managers would focus more effort toward maximizing the wealth of all 
stockholders. But this action results in higher Agency Costs, in order to solve the Agency 
Problem. 
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since the price of stocks, will affect different decisions made by the management 
of a firm. A manager that is interested in maximizing the value of its firm, and the 
wealth of its shareholders, in other words, the stock price, should take proactive 
or reactive measure in the face of “irrational” investors. For example when the 
stock price of the firm is to high a rational manager should issue more shares, to 
take advantage of the investors’ bullish attitude. The opposite should be done if 
the market price of its share is to low (repurchase shares). In other words, the 
managers might use market timing. Therefore this can affect the capital structure 
of the firm. When investors become too pessimistic, it can cause managers to 
forgo possible lucrative projects, since it will be more costly to raise funds, since 
they will need to offer a much higher return to the investors in order to lure them 
to buy their securities (for example bonds). In the case that investors become too 
optimistic about the future prospect of a firm, managers face the danger that if 
they do not undertake specific projects that investors may consider profitable and 
that may enhace their investment, they (managers) may depress stock prices, 
risking his job, or lowering the stock price so much as to risk a takeover. Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003) assert that when a manager faces this situation, that he/she 
feels force to undertake some kind of project or investment, the best decision the 
manager could take may be the acquisition of a less overvalued firm, or one that 
may retain its value in the long run. This argument by Shleifer and Vishny, means 
that these actions taken by managers may lead to waves of takeovers, and 
forsees an increase in stock finance acquisitions when there exists high 
dispertions in valuation, meaning when the acquiring firms stock is excessivly 
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overvalued. Another interesting argument is stated by Shefrin and Statman 
(1984), the authors argue that by paying dividends managers help investors 
avoid regret. They define regret as a frustration that people feel when they 
imagine having taken an action that would have led to a more desirable outcome. 
What Regret Theory basically examines are individual’s emotional reactions to 
having made an error of judgment. For example, buying a “loser” stock, one that 
its price has gone down, or not buying a “winning” stock, or one that has 
experience a positive price change. Therefore, investors might avoid selling 
“loser” stocks, in order to avoid experiencing the regret of having made a bad 
investment. This can also lead to herding, when investors try to find comfort in 
numbers. If they follow the crowd and the stock they bought goes down, then 
their decision might be rationalized as “everybody else owned it”, making the 
decision less regretful. 
  
But managers might also be “irrational” when they think that they are maximizing 
the firms’ value, even if they are not. For example, managers may be 
overconfident, on the analysis they make when taking over another firm, this may 
lead to the manager reacting to quick on his decision to take over the other firm. 
This overconfidence on the part of the manager may lead to excessive takeover 
activity (Roll 1986). Managers may also be overconfident about the future 
performance of their firm, this may lead to different pecking order rules for their 
respective capital structures. Because managers are optimistic, they might 
believe that their company’s stock is undervalued (in the markets), and therefore 
24 
will be reluctant to issue more stocks, unless they have exhausted all other 
financing options, such as retained earnings or the debt market (Heaton 2002). 
 
Limitations 
 
Some of the limitations to the research are stated on this part of the study. First is 
the fact that the study only takes into account the United States Stock Market, in 
later studies it would be good to see how different markets around the world 
reacted to news presented during the time of the Internet bubble. Another 
limitation is that the study was conducted during the time of the Internet bubble, 
which was a time full of noise on stock prices and returns, amplified by the 
exuberant trading behavior presented by investors in the market. Another 
limitation is the news collection process, as many rumors, and “news” presented 
on television or Internet sites, are not documented, and this might affect the 
predictability power of the model used.  
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
 
The literature reviewed to fulfill the objectives of this study is discussed in this 
chapter. In addition to the information mentioned previous chapter, different other 
studies have closely related the stock price to different kinds of announcements 
and news. A brief theoretical background will be developed as part of the 
literature review as well as the discussion of recent academic papers and 
findings. The theoretical framework is as follows. 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Over the past several decades, the field of finance has developed a successful 
paradigm based on the notions that investors and managers were generally 
rational and that the prices of securities were generally “efficient.” In other words, 
the traditional financial paradigm tries to understand the financial markets 
utilizing models where the agents participating in such markets, are rational. By 
rationality it is meant that first, when agents receive new information about a 
security or the market in general, they update their beliefs correctly, as described 
by Bayes’ Law5. And second, given their respective beliefs, agents should make 
choices that are normatively acceptable, consistent with their Subjective 
Expected Utility. According to Barberis and Thaler (2003) “...most models of 
                                                 
5
 Bayes Law relates the conditional and marginal probability distributions of random variables or events. 
The probability of the next event is deduced when a new event occurs, and the new data on the event is 
conditioned to the past probability, it takes into account the last probability and adjusts it.  
26 
asset pricing use the Rational Expectations Equilibrium framework, which 
assumes not only individual rationality but also consistent beliefs. Consistent 
beliefs means that agents’ beliefs are correct: the subjective distribution they use 
to forecast future realizations of unknown variables is indeed the distribution that 
those realizations are drawn from. This requires not only that agents process 
new information correctly, but that they have enough information about the 
structure of the economy to be able to figure out the correct distribution for the 
variables of interest.” .As discussed before, in the justification, this hardly seems 
to be the case. The theoretical framework on which the “efficient market” concept 
is based upon is called the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. As Eugene Fama 
defined it in 1965, in his paper “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices” an 
efficient market is: 
  
“a market where there are large numbers of rational profit maximizers actively 
competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual 
securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to 
all participants” (Fama,1965).  
 
Furthermore: 
 
“In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent participants leads 
to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual securities 
already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have occurred 
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and on events, which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. 
In other words at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good 
estimate of its intrinsic value” 
 
In other words, the hypothesis is based on the notion that investors behave in a 
rational, predictable and unbiased manner. Also, the theory assumes that 
investor’s decision and the price of all stocks (and assets) in the market, reflect 
all publicly available information, and that stock prices should follow a random 
walk, that is, that price changes should be random and unpredictable, and 
therefore do not follow any pattern or trend. According to Eugene Fama: 
 
“In an efficient market, on the average, competition will cause the full effects of 
new information on intrinsic values to be reflected instantaneously in actual 
prices.”  
 
In this framework, a security’s price equals its “fundamental value”, that is the 
present6 or discounted value of expected future cash flows, where the discount 
rate is consistent with a normatively acceptable preference specification.  
                                                 
6Simple formula for Present Value is as follows: PV= CF/(1+i)t . Where CF is the expected future 
cash flow and i is the discount rate. The efficient market model asserts that the price of a security 
(Pt) is equal to the mathematical expectation available at the time of the present value (P*t), in 
general the model would look like Pt=EtP*t, where Et is the mathematical expectation conditional 
on public information at time t. This implies that any surprise movements in stock prices must 
have at their origin some new information about the fundamental value (P*t) (Shiller 2003). An 
interesting finding by Barberis & Huang (2001) shows that when there is good cash flow news, 
the news is accompanied by a lower discount rate, pushing the price up even more. Another 
common model that links stock prices, information and the discount rate is as follows: 
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Three forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis have been proposed. 
 
1. The Weak Form 
2. The Semi Strong Form 
3. The Strong Form 
 
The weak form asserts that current stock prices reflect historical price and 
volume data. This version of the hypothesis implies that trend analysis is 
fruitless, since past stock price data is publicly available and virtually costless to 
obtain.  
The semi strong form asserts that stock prices include not only historical data, 
but also all publicly known available information about the company. Such 
information includes fundamental data on the firm’s product line, quality of 
management, balance sheet composition, patents held, earnings forecasts, and 
accounting practices. This implies that fundamental analysis is of no use in trying 
to beat the market. 
Finally, the strong form of the hypothesis states that stock prices fully reflect all 
information relevant to the firm, both public and private, also including information 
available only to company insiders. This is the most extreme version of the 
efficient markets hypothesis, and the fact that insider information is supposed to 
be reflected in the price of a security should be questioned since there are laws 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pt=E   where Pt is the stock price at time t1, E  refers to the 
mathematical expectation conditional to the information at time t Dt+1 is the dividend to be paid at 
time t+1 and rt+1 is the discount factor for dividends that occur at t+1. 
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to protect against insider trading, or people profiting from privileged information 
before public release.  
 
In other words financial markets are saturated with a large number of intelligent, 
well educated and well informed investors, seeking under and overvalued 
securities to buy or sell. The more and more agents participate in this exercise 
the faster the dissemination of information and the more efficient the market 
should be. Furthermore, in an efficient market there exists what are known as 
arbitrageurs or “smart money” that will look for the mispricing or arbitrage 
opportunities, created by naive investors, and try to benefit from this. This action, 
on the part of the arbitrageurs, brings the prices back to their fundamental 
values, bringing equilibrium to the financial markets stock prices. But there is a 
small problem with this rationale about the arbitrageurs, since there exists 
different constraints in the markets that might prevent the smart money from 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities, for example short sale constraints. A short sale 
is when an investor borrows the stock from its current owner of that stock. The 
owner of the stock (lender) may charge a fee for the short seller (borrower). The 
fee to be charged is simply determined by the supply and demand forces for that 
particular stock in the stock loan market. In addition to the cost of borrowing there 
are other costs and risks associated with short selling, as there might also be 
laws that impose constraints to selling short. Fear of losing out on their short sale 
positions because of, for example continued upward trend in an overvalued 
stock, may prevent arbitrageurs to sell short. Another problem would arise when 
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there is excessive optimism in the markets. If there is excessive optimism on the 
part of naive investors, the demand for stocks will rise, leading to a limited 
amount of stocks that can be shorted. As there is a limited amount of stocks that 
can be shorted (since the rest are on the hands of naive investors), the price of 
shorting will go up, probably exceeding the benefits that the arbitrageurs can 
derive from the short sale. Yet another problem, is the fact that arbitrageurs 
might derive a better return by just following the over optimism by the naive 
investors, since this behavior adds to the market movement of prices, and the 
arbitrageurs might not short sell at all.(Shleifer & Summers 1990). 
According to Ullman (1985) economic performance of the firm can be measured 
by accounting variables, stock price movements, or monthly returns, depending 
on the research objective. This will focus on stock price, returns and changes in 
volume and how the different types of news released by the media affect the 
perception of the investors, and therefore ultimately, how this change in behavior 
by the investors, will affect their investing strategies, and their decision to buy or 
sell, affecting in this way the stock price of the firm.  
 
Stock Prices, Investor Behavior and Herd Behavior 
Stock prices are determined by a number of factors. A company’s operating 
performance is extremely important, but is just one of many factors, and most of 
these other factors are beyond management’s control. The biggest external 
factor is overall market trend, as reflected in changes to the market’s discount 
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rate, or cost of capital. When the cost of capital falls the market advances, and 
vice-versa. Other important external factor is changing market expectations. It is 
in this factor (market expectations) that investor behavior has the strongest 
impact on the stock price. For example, many uninformed traders will simply 
follow any trends they believe exist in the financial markets, this behavior 
increases the volatility observed in the market, as these investors are unaware of 
the real fundamental values of the securities being traded, and therefore are 
unable to stop trading once the security is overvalued (Shleifer & Summers 
1990). This type of behavior causes price movements in the stock market, which 
are not related to the fundamental values of the firms. These trend chasers are 
basically uninformed investors, and their behavior can cause a speculative 
bubble (Caginalp, Porter & Smith 2000).This behavior, when individuals take 
actions, uninformed and mimicking the actions of others is called herd effect. 
According to Robert Pretcher (2001): “Human herding behavior results from 
impulsive mental activity in individuals responding to signals from the behavior of 
others”. The author states that given the biological process that occurs during 
this practice these impulses to herd are typically faster than rational reflection. 
According to Pretcher: “The reasons forecasters, inaccuracy worsens with 
herding is that the net valuation of the stock market is the result of herding. To 
forecast on the basis of the current sentiments of the herd is to forecast the 
present mood, not future events. Success is simply a matter of whether the 
present mood maintains, which it usually does not.” An interesting fact is that 
when individuals engage in herd behavior, they tend to disregard the information 
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received and keep on replicating the herd movement. This herding pattern 
usually occurs when individuals believe that the herd has better information than 
the information the individuals have, and when the herding behavior starts to 
occur, the decision taken by the herd, overwhelm the signals that any particular 
individual receives (Owen 2002)7. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) state that 
many investors decide to trade only a subset of all available securities. As the 
investors’ risk aversion or expectations changes, they alter the exposure to the 
particular securities they hold. This view of co-movement indicates that there will 
be a common factor in the returns of securities that are the primary holding of a 
subset of investors, for example tech stocks during the Internet bubble. Another 
interesting point is the fact that not only “naive” investors fall in to herding 
behavior, but it also happens to the professional investor such as mutual funds 
managers. On a study done by Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) it is shown that 
mutual fund managers are more likely to buy or sell a particular security if other 
managers in the same city are buying or selling the security. The authors argue 
that this usually happens when the security being traded and the fund manager 
in question are located far apart. The authors explain that the evidence can be 
interpreted in terms of a model in which investors share information and spread 
this information by word of mouth. This word of mouth effect also affects 
                                                 
7
 An interesting model is developed by Owen (2002) to explain the decision to buy by an individual 
affected by herd behavior, the model states that Djt=E(Rt+k│ Ωjt) + I Where the decision Djt is based on 
the expectations of the jth investor has for future returns on the stock, E(Rt+k) , given the signal the 
individual receives Ωjt plus the previous actions of other investors I., when many investors are 
added to the mix, an informational cascade occurs, and they start ignoring the signals they 
receive and give more weight to the actions taken by others. 
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investors’ behavior when speculative prices rise. This situation creates success 
for some investors, this attracts public and media attention and promotes a word 
of mouth enthusiasm, and this enthusiasm increases expectations for future price 
increases. According to Robert Shiller (2003): “The talks attract attention to “new 
era” theories and “popular models” that justify the price increases. This process 
in turn increases investor demand and thus generates another round of price 
increases. If the feedback is not interrupted, it may produce after many rounds a 
speculative bubble, in which high expectations for further price increases support 
very high current prices”. This situation of word of mouth feedback models 
translate exactly to what happened during the Internet bubble, where nor only the 
information was spread from investor to investor, but the media played a crucial 
part on these “success stories” and positive outlook being spread through the 
masses. According to the author speculative bubbles appear to be common to 
certain investing style, for example buying tech stocks during the end of the 90’s. 
In a paper by Barberis and Shleifer (2000) it is discussed how news about one 
style of investing can affect stock prices from apparently unrelated styles. The 
authors argue that one of the clearest elements of human thought is 
classification, and that we tend to classify using different categories. Individual 
investors tend to do the same and they classify assets and stocks based on their 
qualities. This classification by styles, cause the securities grouped in a specific 
category to co-move. 
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Noise Trading 
Another interesting factor that in my opinion can induce to some extend the 
herding behavior is noise trading. According to Black (1986) noise trading is 
“…trading on noise as if it were information. People who trade on noise are 
willing to trade even though from an objective point of view they would be better 
off not trading. Perhaps they think the noise they are trading on is information. Or 
perhaps they just like to trade”. The author also asserts that noise trading must 
account for a significant part of the total trading in the financial markets. Trueman 
(1988) argues that investment fund managers may be motivated to engage in 
noise trading. According to Trueman this is done on the part of the investment 
managers in order to convey to investors that he/she is well informed. This 
should lead investors to increase the amount of money that they invest in the 
fund. The author states that noise trading is more commonly observed in risky 
assets. This goes in accordance to the fact that when people have little 
information or there is asymmetry in the information and uncertainty, they tend to 
base their decisions on the most readily available information, and they may 
interpret any information they receive as “hard facts” or “real facts” and base their 
decisions on the “information” received, given the time constraints that investors 
face when making an investment decision in the fast paced financial markets. As 
it has been documented the ability to avoid errors of intuitive judgment is 
impaired by time pressure and constraints. (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & 
Johnson 2000). So basically an investors’ decision to buy or not to buy based on 
the information being given will be influenced by the time he/she has to make the 
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decision, this will limit the amount of information the investor can analyze, and 
will tend to follow the most readily available information, even if its noise. The 
investor might not have time to rationalize if it’s a real fact or just noise, since 
he/she might lose the timing of the investment, or the investment opportunity 
window. Therefore the processing of information might be superficial. Since most 
of this information the investors receive through the media is in fact “noise”, 
investors’ decisions may be wrongly based and easily swayed by more “noise”, 
adding to the volatility of the markets. This may also affect firm managers, if 
these managers listen to investors’ opinions, because perhaps, they may think 
that investors know something that they do not know, therefore managers may 
misinterpret excessive optimism as well founded optimism. This may lead 
managers to undertake bad investments at wrong times, or negative net present 
value investments, since they might think that these investments could be 
profitable given investors optimisms (Barberis & Thaler 2003). Many financial 
news that reach investors during a day of trading, are based on rumors or 
assumptions and not real facts, making these news basically noise (for example 
rumors of mergers, etc). 
 
Signaling 
As mentioned before, given the asymmetry in information that exists in the 
market place, where investors may not be fully informed about all the situations 
affecting their investments, returns etc, individuals may rely excessively on 
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information signals. Signaling theory is based on the assumption that information 
is not equally available to all participants in the market at the same time, and that 
there exist information asymmetry. The creator of signaling theory was Michael 
Spence (1973) who as part of his doctoral dissertation researched on the 
signaling in the job markets, this later has been applied to different other areas of 
studies. Investors rely on signal because the direct evaluation of the decision to 
be taken, the quality of an investment, the fundamentals of a company, etc, might 
be too difficult to evaluate. A signal is a piece of information that might create, 
change or confirm expectations on the part of the investors. The act of signaling 
is sending signals that influence expectations. The signals can be strong or 
weak, isolated or repetitive, and also the signal can have different weights8 for 
the receiver of the signal. Given different constraints in investors’ making like 
limited attention, memory and processing capabilities, investors and individuals in 
general tend to focus on subsets of available information; also unconscious 
associations create a selective focus. The verbal signals individual receive 
triggers associations that influence judgments (Higgins 1996) (Gilovich 1981). 
This selective focus and selective triggering causes what is known as the 
salience effect, where an information signal is referred as a salient signal if it has 
characteristics that are good at calling or captivating our attention or at creating 
easy association that facilitate the recall of information. According to a study 
done by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), items that are easily recalled are judge 
to be more common. The fact that during the Internet bubble, most of the 
                                                 
8
 The strength of an information signal is how “extreme” the evidence is and the weight is the reliability of 
the signal or its precision (Griffin & Tversky 1992). 
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companies that were providing high returns in the market were tech stock, 
investors in general associated tech stocks with high returns, without regards to 
what kind of business the company conducted, or if the company had a sound 
financial condition. Examples of signals sent by managers of firms, to convey the 
financial state of the firm, or the perception management has towards the price of 
the company stock are stock splits, changes in dividend policies, stock 
repurchases, changes in management and others. Another example occurs 
when investment managers trade on their respective portfolios without having 
any new private information, to convey to investors or potential investors that 
he/she is well informed. This is done on the part of the investment manager in 
order to attract more money to the portfolios because investors might get the 
signal that they are well informed professionals, when in fact they are trading on 
noise. A very interesting example of the usage of specific signals as a 
manipulation tool is given by Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2004), where the authors 
state that “…46% of all firms that announce share repurchase programs do not 
purchase a single share within the quarter of or the quarter following the 
announcement. As a matter of fact, 27% of firms that announce, do not 
repurchase within four fiscal years of the announcement …Thus if repurchase 
signals value, then these firms simply use announcement, which is virtually 
costless, to attract scrutiny from speculators and have their true value 
discovered, whereas the rest of the firms repurchase their stocks which is costly, 
to signal their value”. Therefore managers and firms use information signals to 
influence investors’ behavior.  
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As stated before, not all demand changes appear to be supported by 
fundamentals, and also they might not appear to be rational decisions on the part 
of the investors. But these changes can be influenced by signals, or pseudo-
signals that investors perceived as conveying information about the future of their 
investments (Black 1986) An example of such signals are recommendations or 
advice given by investment professionals, brokers or the so called “investment 
gurus”. Depending on the strength of the signal, and the weight the investors give 
to it, will define if the investors act or not on the signal received (buy or sell), this 
can be considered noise as well. Although the signal received by the investor 
may not be supported by the fundamentals of the firm in question, it might be 
related to such fundamentals, therefore conveying the idea that it is “real news” 
about the company, and the investors might decide to give more weight to the 
signal, and act on it. Hirshliefer (2001) stated that people tend to excessively rely 
on the strength of the information signal and under rely on the weight of such 
signals. 
This signaling is really important to this study, since the investors are constantly 
bombarded with signals being sent by companies, brokers, media, financial 
gurus, etc, and the investor must choose to which types of signal he/she will pay 
more attention. This is related to the classification of news in this study, in order 
to see which type of news investors respond to the most, or give more weight, 
depending on the way these investors react to it. Many interesting question can 
be derived from this in the study of the Internet bubble, for example, was the 
media constant coverage, and constantly portraying a bullish attitude done in 
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purpose in order to keep investors’ sentiment high, and keep the bullish market 
going?. Was it all fault of the media or did the companies played a part on this 
too?. It seems as it would surely benefit those companies to keep their stock 
prices high, in order for the managers to obtain more funds through the issuing of 
new stocks. And definitely the investment banks involved in all the new stock 
issuing, IPO’s and all the related services to raising funds, should also have big 
interest in maintaining the bubble going since they were profiting substantially 
from that situation. But this is a topic that can be investigated in another study. 
Let’s take a look at different market “anomalies” in order to better understand the 
influence investor behavior has over the market prices of stock, independently of 
how good or bad is the performance of a company.   
Since the 1960´s many researchers have tested the efficient market hypothesis, 
and in recent years, some “anomalies” started to appear, that seem to contradict 
such hypothesis. Some examples of these “anomalies” are: 
 
1. The January Effect- Stocks in general, but particularly small 
company stocks, have generated abnormally high returns during 
the month of January, they tend to rise from December to January 
(Thaler 1987) (Haugen & Jorion 1996). This may be explain by 
investors selling losers during the month of December, for tax 
reasons, and then buying them back 
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2. Turn of the Month Effect- Stocks consistently show higher returns 
on the last day and first four days of the month (Ariel 1987).(Hansel 
& Ziemba 1996) It is interesting to mention that according to Ariel, 
the rest of the month displays mainly negative returns. 
3. The Monday Effect- Monday tends to be the worst day to invest in 
stocks, and negative movements from Friday to Monday are also 
observed in the markets (Fields 1931) (Harris 1986) (Smirlock & 
Starks 1986) 
4. Holiday Effect- The day before holidays usually shows abnormal 
positive returns. (Ariel 1990) (Lakonishok & Smidt 1988) 
5. Intra-day Effect- Generally prices fall during the first 45 minutes on 
Monday, but rise sharply during the first 45 minutes of all other 
weekdays, and during the last hour of the trading day, specially the 
last trade (Harris 1986). 
6. Size Effect- Small firms tend to outperform, in asset capitalization, 
the big firms.(Banz 1981) 
7. Mean Reversion9- Over long periods of time Stocks that perform 
badly in the past tend to perform better in the future and vice-
versa.(DeBondt & Thaler 1985)(Fama & French 1992) 
8. The S&P “Game”10- When stocks are added to the S&P index, 
their prices tend to rise by almost 3%, without any new information 
being released.(Shleifer 1986) (Harris & Gruel 1986)  
                                                 
9
 Bondt and Thaler (1985) found that stocks that had high returns over three years tended to show negative 
cumulative returns in the succeeding three years, and stocks that had low returns over the prior three years 
tended to have positive returns over the following three years. 
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9. Value Investing Approach11- Historically investors overestimate 
the prospects of growth companies and underestimate value 
companies. In other words, investors underpriced out of favor 
stocks but are overly optimistic about growth companies. 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny  1994) 
 
Many other anomalies are present in the markets, and as Peter Bernstein states 
in his book Against the Gods, the Remarkable Story of Risk: “the evidence 
reveals repeated patterns of irrationality, inconsistency, and incompetence in the 
way human beings arrive at decisions and choices when faced with uncertainty”. 
But it is not that the investors are irrational, but only that the existing models 
consider this results and irrational behavior as “anomalies” or “errors investors 
make”. A good question arises then, are these examples really “anomalies”, if 
they keep repeating themselves over and over in the markets? or, why do 
investors keep on committing these errors over and over?. As Eugene Fama 
stated in his 1998 paper “Market Efficiency, Long Term Returns and Behavioral 
Finance”, these anomalies are chance deviations to be expected under market 
efficiency. But as Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) stated, “we 
believe the evidence does not accord with this view point, because some of the 
return patterns are strong and regular…and are present both internationally and 
                                                                                                                                                 
10
 The authors attribute this appreciation by the increased demand of the stocks being added, by index fund, 
mutual funds, and others, that try to replicate the S&P index. 
11
 Under the value investing approach other anomalies exist, such as outperformance of firms that show low 
book to market ratios, when compare to high book to market ratio companies, as well as low price earnings 
ratio to high price earnings ratios. 
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in different time periods”. So how can we explain why these “anomalies” and 
such investor behavior happen?  
 
 
Behavioral Finance and Investor Psychology 
 
This is where Behavioral Finance comes in. It attempts to explain how emotions 
and cognitive errors influence the investors and the decision making process. It 
tries to explain why, for example, during the Internet bubble; investors seemed to 
ignore critical information about the stocks they bought, bidding the prices up, 
and then pushing them back down. Obviously the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
does not explain this kind of behavior, even though investors had the information 
to take sound decisions. Again, it is not that investors are irrational, but that their 
thinking and decisions are often guided (or misguided) by biases and cognitive 
illusions. Biases are judgments that can be systematically wrong or systematic 
errors of judgment. Another important issue to remember is the fact that investors 
are not identical, so even if they have the same information they might react 
differently. Behavioral Finance combines the theory of finance from different 
ideas from fields like psychology and sociology, which often portray more realistic 
ideas on how people think and react to different aspects of life. This combination 
of ideas can help to understand better the way investors behave in the financial 
markets, and when making financial decisions. 
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Prospect Theory 
 
Theorists argue that any significant decision is basically a choice between 
gambles, because the outcomes of the options available are not fully known in 
advance. A gamble is characterized by the range of its possible outcomes and by 
the probabilities of these outcomes. The majority of models dealing with risky 
gambles and asset prices assume that individuals evaluate gambles according to 
their expected utilities. The roots of such thinking goes back to Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944), the study showed that if an individual’s preferences 
satisfy a number of axioms, these being, completeness, transitivity, continuity, 
and independence, then it can be represented by the utility function. But different 
experimental studies have demonstrated that individuals systematically violate 
the expected utility framework (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). According to Kahneman 
and Riepe (1998), people make judgments about probabilities; they assign 
values (also called by economists utilities) to outcomes. The combination of 
beliefs and values is what forms preferences about risky options.  Furthermore in 
Kahneman and Tversky “Prospect Theory” (1979), they state that people 
respond differently to equivalent situations depending on whether it is 
represented in the context of a loss or a gain. Typically, they become 
considerably more distressed at the prospect of losses than they are made 
happy by equivalent gains. This loss aversion means that people are willing to 
take more risks to avoid losses than to realize gains. Based on their study, even 
when investors are faced with sure gain, most investors are risk averse; but 
when faced with sure loss, they become risk takers. According to the endowment 
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effect12, people set a higher price on something they own than they would be 
prepared to pay to acquire it. The evidence presented by Kahneman and Tversky 
suggests that the degree of loss aversion shown by individuals depends on prior 
gains and losses. For example, a loss that comes after a prior gain is less painful 
than usual, because it is buffered by the earlier gains. Now, if a loss comes after 
other losses it is more painful than usual, therefore individuals become more 
sensitive to additional setbacks. Thaler and Johnson (1990) found that after a 
gain on a prior gamble, individuals are more risk seeking than usual, while after a 
loss, these individuals become more risk averse. In addition in a previous study 
done by these same two psychologists (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), they stated 
that people judgments tend to be made using a representativeness heuristic, 
where they try to predict, by seeking the closest match to past patterns. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), state that intuition plays a crucial role in most of 
investor’s financial decisions, since these decisions are made under situations of 
high complexity and high uncertainty. Another important part in Prospect Theory 
is the fact that utilities are defined over gains and losses and not on the final 
wealth positions. In other words, Prospect Theory will focus in changes of wealth, 
and expected utility theory focuses on the level of wealth. Another interesting 
point implied by the authors is the fact that as Kahneman stated “Utility cannot be 
divorced from emotions, and emotions are triggered by changes”. The approach 
that Prospect Theory takes seems as a more natural way to view gambles. The 
                                                 
12
 The Endowment Effect: The value of a good increases when it becomes a part of a person’s endowment. 
The person demands more to give up an object then they would be willing to pay to acquire it. 
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authors give a very interesting example in their paper; they ask a group of 
subjects the following questions. 
 
In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1000. Now choose 
between these two gambles 
 A= You can bet the 1000 with a 50% probability of earning it all and a 50% 
probability of not winning anything 
 
 B= You can earn 500 with a probability of 1 
B was the most popular choice between the two gambles.  
 
The second question was stated as follows 
In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 2000. Now choose 
between 
 C= Losing 1000 with a probability of 50% or not losing anything with a 
probability of 50% 
 
 D= Losing 500 with a probability of 1 
 
Now, with the question formulated differently the most popular answer was C. If 
we take a closer look at the final wealth position the two problems are identical, 
but individuals chose differently when the question was formulated in terms of 
losses or gains. This is known as framing. It refers to the way a problem or a 
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situation is proposed to the decision maker. Framing effects are very powerful 
and there are various demonstrations of an impact of 30% to 40% in changes in 
preferences depending on how the problem or situation is conveyed or worded 
(Barberis & Thaler 2003). This is very important for this study since the wording 
of the news being released may sway investors’ decisions to buy or sell, 
depending on how the news is portrayed. For example, during the Internet 
bubble, most news and investment firms’ recommendations were of the positive 
kind. These news and recommendations only helped to reinforce investors’ 
perceptions about the market, swaying them to buy stocks that for the most part 
were overvalued. In addition individual events provide a temporal anchor upon 
which expectations are based. This implies that investor perceptions will have a 
greater impact on an investor’s behavior, if it is about the near future, and has a 
strongly positive or negative affective quality, is well known, and has potentially 
vivid consequences (Loewestein et. al. 2001). Anticipation of probable rewards 
generates positive affect. Positive affect increases investors risk taking behaviors 
and this will in part affect the trading volume of the session and the return of the 
related stocks. If the news and signals received are perceived as negative, this 
will lead to anxiety and negative affect in investors. Negative affects should 
accelerate risk averse, protective behaviors or selling of stock. If we combined 
this statements with the signaling theory mentioned before, noise trading, 
prospect theory and the biases that will be mentioned later, we can get a clearer 
idea of why different types or categories of news will have a different impact on 
investors’ trading behavior, and to which news these investors will pay more or 
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less attention, depending on the benefit these investors perceive acting on the 
signal will provide them. 
This phenomenon seems to definitely affect investors’ behavior and therefore it 
could affect company’s stock prices and returns, as well as trading volume during 
a specific date.  
Investors’ Biases 
 
There are different biases that affect this intuitive judgment and therefore affect 
the investment decisions. Some of these cognitive biases are (Kahneman & 
Tversky 1974) (Alpert & Raiffa 1982) (Weinstein 1980) (Buehler, Griffin and Ross 
1994) (Rabin 2002) (Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979) (Shefrin 2000) (Brunnermeir & 
Parker 2003) (Thaler 1980):  
 
1. Overconfidence- Investors habitually assume they know more 
than they do. They also reinterpret past decisions to exaggerate 
their own foresight (Odean 1998). 
2. Availability bias- The tendency to base decisions on the most 
readily available information. Also when individuals judge the 
probability of an event they will search their memories for relevant 
information (Tversky & Kahneman 1973). Since according to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) not all memories are equally 
retrievable or available, more recent events will be given more 
weight and this will distort the individual’s estimate. 
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3. Representativeness Heuristic- Projecting from stereotypes. 
Assessing the probability of a state of the world based on the 
degree to which the evidence presented is perceived as similar to 
or typical of the state of the world (Tversky & Kahneman 1973) 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1974) Investors project from stereotypes as 
seen during the Internet bubble, where the companies that were 
perceived as tech stocks, where also perceived as potential 
winners. 
4. Sample Size Neglect- When individuals judge the likelihood that a 
data set was generated by a particular model, they often neglect to 
take into account the size of the sample. This means that when 
individuals do not initially know the data-generating process they 
will tend to infer it too rapidly on the basis of too few data points. 
5. Optimism and “Wishful Thinking”- Most people are biased in the 
direction of optimism; people display unrealistic positive views of 
their abilities and prospects. It is interesting to note that people 
display a systematic planning error. They predict that tasks, such 
as writing a thesis, will be completed a lot sooner than the tasks 
actually are (Buehler, Griffin and Ross (1994)).  
6. Conservatism- According to Barberis & Thaler (2003), it appears 
that if a data sample is representative of an underlying model, then 
individuals will tend to overweight the data. However if the data is 
not representative of any relevant model, then people react to little 
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to the data and rely too much on their priors, leading to 
conservatism. 
7. Aversion to Ambiguity- This is the preference by individuals, for 
the familiar over the unfamiliar. This leads to another bias known as 
the home bias, where investors allocate a bigger part of their assets 
to domestic companies. Also, individuals are not comfortable in 
situations where they are uncertain about the probability distribution 
of a gamble. 
8. Loss Aversion- Investors tend to put more weight, or give more 
importance to avoiding losses.(Kahneman & Tversky 1979) 
9. Belief Perseverance- When individuals form an opinion, they tend 
to hang on to that opinion too strongly and for too long.(Lord, Ross 
and Lepper (1979)) This occurs since individuals are reluctant to 
search for any evidence that could contradict their initial beliefs, 
and if by any chance they find such evidence, they treat it with 
excessive skepticism, for example, stock overvaluation during the 
Internet bubble.  
10. Self Attribution Bias- Investors ascribe successful outcomes to 
their skills, but blame failure on their bad luck, rather than to their 
inability to perform well. This repeated behavior will lead individuals 
to the pleasing but erroneous conclusion that they are very 
talented.(as discussed by Barberis & Thaler 2003) 
50 
11. Biased Self Attribution- This happens when investors attach too 
much significance to signals that confirm their prior beliefs and too 
little significance to information signals that contradicts them. 
(Fischhoff 1982) (Miller & Ross 1975) (Taylor & Brown 1988) 
12. Hindsight Bias- The tendency by the part of individuals, after an 
event has occurred, that they predicted it before it happened 
(Hawkins & Hastie 1990) 
13. Anchoring and Adjustment- Too conservative extrapolation from 
current data, and too slow readjustment of expectations based on 
changes. People fixate too much on initial values. (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1974) 
14. Mental Accounting13- The process by which people think about 
and evaluate their financial transactions. Individuals sometimes 
separate decisions that in principle should be combined (Thaler 
1985) 
15. The Halo Effect- When someone, in our case an investor, likes 
one outstanding characteristic of an individual (a company) and 
generalizes this favorable evaluation to all other aspects and other 
characteristics of the company. (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) 
16. Illusion of truth- Individuals are more inclined to accept the truth of 
a statement that is easily processed. Also familiar signal 
combinations are more readily accepted than unfamiliar signal 
                                                 
13
 This behavior may lead to what is called the disposition effect which is the propensity by individuals to 
hold on to investments or stocks that have lost value, and sell those who have gained value, in order to 
realize “paper gains” (Shefrin & Statman 1985). 
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combinations. (Bruner, Postman & Rodrigues 1951) (Reber & 
Schwarz 1999) 
17. Narrow Framing- Individuals analyze problems in a too isolated 
fashion. (Read, Loewenstein & Rabin 1999) (Kahneman & Lovallo 
1993) 
18. Status Quo Bias- Occurs when individuals prefer the choice which 
is designated as default or status quo among the selection of 
alternatives offered (Samuelson & Zeckhauser 1988). 
19.  Gambler’s Fallacy- This is the belief that in an independent 
sample the occurrence of one outcome (recent) increases the odds 
that the next outcome will differ. (Clotfelter & Cook 1993).  
20. False Consensus Effect- Individuals mistakenly believe that other 
individuals share their beliefs more than these other individuals 
really do (Ross, Green & House 1977).  
 
There are also dependence factors that affect investors, like, concurring 
decisions, hedonic editing, regret and money illusion. These different biases and 
dependence factors cause investors, and therefore also the markets, to over and 
under react when presented with different kinds of information (Daniel, Hirshleifer 
& Subrahmanyam 1998). Investors put too much weight on recent news at the 
expense of other data, causing this market over- or under reaction. People tend 
to become more optimistic when the market goes up and more pessimistic when 
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the market goes down. Therefore, prices fall too much on bad news, and rise too 
much on good news.  
Suggestion and investors perception has a lot to do with this. According to 
Loewenstein et. al. (2001), the vividly imagined possibility of imminently 
achievable wealth and material success in an average investor will lead to a 
strong drive to invest in an asset. Likewise, the vividly imagined possibility of 
personal poverty or market panic will generate the desire to divest or sell the 
asset. Combine this with the feedback models mentioned before, the media 
releasing bullish news, and the investors supporting overvalued prices, and we 
can better understand why the Internet bubble happened and the impact the 
information had over investors’ behavior and stock prices. Macgregor, Slovic, 
Dremen, and Berry (2000) found that subjective affect and imagery influence 
investors’ judgment in predicting assets financial performance. Other studies 
have documented that environmental factors that alter individuals’ moods are 
correlated with stock price movements (Kamstra, Kramer and Levy 2000)  
 
The biases mentioned before lead to different errors in investors’ behavior such 
as insufficient diversification (home bias, availability bias, aversion to ambiguity), 
naive diversification (availability bias, representativeness, anchoring, home bias, 
1/n diversification14 and others), excessive trading (overconfidence), just to name 
                                                 
14
 This means that when people diversify they usually do it allocating 1/n of their savings to each n of 
available investment option. 
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a few.15 The interesting thing is that these biases and the errors of judgment they 
can cause are not random errors but systematic errors, meaning that investors 
commit the errors of judgment systematically. 
If we take into account the investors biases presented above, especially the 
availability bias, representativeness heuristics, and imagery, it is logical to think 
that different types of news should affect investors differently. According to 
behavioral finance and signaling theory, since there exists an information gap, 
and taking into account the availability bias of the investors (and the other biases 
mentioned above), they might invest in a stock depending only on the signal 
sent. So let’s suppose, for example, that a new compensation plan is announced 
for company X, and the compensation of the CEO of the company X is now 
changed and is mostly linked to the performance of the firm, due to the lack of 
information the investors have about the insides of the company, they might 
believe that the CEO has some insider information not known to them, and that is 
the reason why the CEO has accepted a new compensation mix, or that the CEO 
expects future firm performance to be good. Based on this signal sent by the 
company, and the CEO, investors would buy the stock driving the price up. But 
this appraisal (in the short run) has nothing to do with the CEO performance or 
“actions” taken, but only on the perception and expectations of the investors. 
According to Marcus and Goodman (1991), “the market price of a good or 
service is influenced by the signals sent…”, the authors state that by applying 
signaling theory to the stock market, we can see that investors buy and sell stock 
                                                 
15
 It should be pointed out that Barber & Odean (2002)  mentioned that the greater access to information 
and a greater degree of control over investments, offered by online trading services has been shown to 
increase investors’ overconfidence 
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with incomplete information and can be influenced by presentations of corporate 
policy. There are important points to this, the first is that “in any market there is 
an information gap between buyers and sellers, with buyers knowing less about 
the commodity sold than sellers, and second, sellers emit a signal at some point 
during a transaction and buyers respond to this signal (Barzel, 1976; Mirrlees 
1971; Riley 1975)”. We should also take into account what Ross (1977) states 
that “the manager should also be assumed to have special inside information 
about the firm”, this also sends a signal to the market, given changes in the 
compensation mix, about the expectations of CEO about firms future financial 
performance. Westphal and Zajac (1998) state that top managers can satisfy 
external demands for increased accountability to shareholders while avoiding 
unwanted compensation risk and loss of autonomy by adopting, but not 
implementing, governance structures that address stockholders interest and by 
bolstering such actions with social legitimate language. In other words, a CEO 
can influence the investor’s perception of the future of the company, by just 
transmitting or adopting governance structures that signal to the investors that 
their interests are safe. The authors also add a very interesting point, stating that 
the stock market reactions are viewed in the financial economics literature as 
providing hard numbers about the value of the firm, while from their stand point, 
firms can influence market reactions and therefore change the underlying value 
of the firm through the use of symbolic action. This discussion takes us to a 
series of propositions: 
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Proposition 1 
It would be expected that investors will give more importance to the category of 
news which they feel will signal, more tangible gains or losses on their 
investments. Investors tend to classify their decision frames into transparent and 
opaque (Tversky & Kahneman 1986), transparent being a clearer set of 
information and opaque being a “not so clear” set of information for the investor. 
It is expected that investors will pay more attention to Financial and Marketing 
news, since the information these news convey seem to have a clearer cause-
effect impact over an investor’s return than Human Resources and Research and 
Development news seem to have, as investors might not clearly understand a 
direct relation between the latter news and their investment’s return. 
 
 
Proposition 2 
There should be higher trading volumes when news are presented. As the 
literature suggests, the higher the changes in trading volume, the bigger the 
impact the news presented had on investor trading behavior. 
 
The discussion presented before shows how the perceptions of the investors can 
be influenced, and how they can take actions (buy or sell), just based on that 
perception, and not necessarily because fundamental numbers support stock 
prices. According to Beatty and Zajac (1987) market reactions should be viewed 
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more as soft numbers that reflect the perceptions of a heterogeneous audience. 
Westphal and Zajac (1998) also add that given the fast response and imperfect 
communication that characterizes market reactions to announced events, 
investors can be expected to estimate how other investors will act, and this 
estimations will be influenced by prior market responses to similar events. This 
goes in accordance with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1974) representativeness 
heuristics.  
In my opinion the stock price of the firm is affected by investors’ behavior, which 
is influenced by news about the company. Also different kinds of news should 
affect investors’ behavior differently. This brings us to the main problem of my 
study: 
 
How do different news (as classified by different categories) affect 
investors’ perception and behavior and therefore the return of the firm’s 
shares? Also which of the news categories proposed have a stronger 
impact over investors’ perceptions and stock returns?  
 
In addition to the information mentioned above, different other studies have 
closely related the stock price to different kinds of announcements and news. For 
Example, Pearce and Roley (1985) studied the response of stock prices to 
announcements about the money supply, inflation, real economic activity, and 
the discount rate. Jain (1988) analyzed the response of stocks return and volume 
to economic data such as consumer price index, unemployment rate, and 
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industrial production. Liu, Smith and Azmat (1995) examined the impact of the 
information reported by the Wall Street Journal on the stocks recommended. 
Allen and Gale (1992) studied the impact of uninformed speculators activities 
over the price of shares, and how this behavior could sway investors’ buying-
selling activities, if investors perceived the speculator is well informed. McQueen 
and Roley (1993) investigated the relationship between stock prices, economic 
news and different stages of the business cycle. Ikenberry et. al. (1995) found 
that stock prices rise on the announcement of share repurchases. Michaely, 
Thaler, and Womack (1995) found similar evidence, but taking into account news 
of dividend initiation and omissions. Ederington and Lee (1995) conducted a 
study on how prices on the foreign exchange future market adjust to new 
information contained in macroeconomic news, in the short run. Desai and Jain 
(1995) studied the impact of “Superstar” money managers on the return of 
shares. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) found 
evidence on price changes after seasoned equity offerings. Ikenberry, Rankine, 
and Stice (1996) did a similar study but looking at price changes after “stock split” 
news. Womack (1996) found that analysts’ recommendations have also an 
impact on stock prices. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1997) and Fama 
(1998) summarize a large number of event studies showing different reactions to 
news events. Titman (2002), Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) discussed the 
underreaction of self selected news events. Buckley and Herrerias (2002) studied 
and found a relation between the returns of stocks and (after) profit warnings. 
Chan (2002) studied what is the reaction of stock prices to news and no news. 
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Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov and Yu (2003) conducted a study on the 
relationship between share prices, and the addition of companies’ stocks to the 
S&P 500 index, the authors assert that not only does the addition has an impact 
over the stock price but also over the earnings per share forecasts and realized 
earnings. Morgan and Stocken (2003) examined the information content of stock 
reports when the investors are uncertain about the analyst’s incentives. Hong, 
Kubic and Stein (2005) studied the reaction on the trading behavior of mutual 
fund managers when other managers in the same city buy or sell a specific 
stock. Some of these studies look at different kind of events, how they affect 
investors, as well as what was the impact on the market. Other studies look at 
the reactions of investors based on bad or good news.  Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) observe that market prices cannot perfectly reflect all available 
information, or else information gatherers would earn no compensation for their 
costly activities. The authors argued that if all information or at least relevant 
information is already reflected in the market prices of securities, market agents 
would have no incentive to acquire the information on which market prices are 
based. But this is not the case in financial market, where agents gather 
information and use this information for individual use or on behalf of clients. 
Taking this into account, practitioners, especially brokerage firms, would benefit 
from knowing what kind news affects stock prices and therefore, their investors 
the most, and these firms could anticipate what are the needs of their clients, and 
how they could customize their strategies in order to make more attractive their 
advice and business. But not only would financial firms benefit from this, also 
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individual investor could anticipate what is going to be the approximate reaction 
of the market, changes in price-return of different stocks, and take advantage of 
this in order to improve their returns, and make the most of their investing 
strategies.  
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CHAPTER III 
Methodology 
 
The methodology utilized to fulfill the objectives of this study is discussed in this 
chapter. In order to fulfill the purpose of this study, relevant information was 
gathered by reviewing the appropriate literature, identifying information related to 
the movement and volatility of stock prices, market volatility, factors that 
influence stock prices, expectations, investor psychology, and event study 
methods.  
 
As stated before, this study will try to measure two basic things. First, the 
perception investors have about different types of news and how these news 
affects their investing behavior. The second variable to be measure is the change 
in prices and therefore stock returns, that occur when investors start buying or 
selling based on specific company news. In the study it will also be measured 
which type of news have more impact on investors behavior and therefore on the 
return of the company stock. The impact the news has over investor behavior, 
whether he/she buys or sells their stocks, can be seen through the changes in 
trading volumes. Many studies have found that increased trading volume was 
associated to the release of new information (Karpoff, 1986) (Bamber, 1986) 
(Jarell, 1989).According to Jain (1988): “Announcements about economic 
variables may also affect trading volume if the market participants rebalance their 
portfolios based on the new information”. On a study by Nikolai Chuvakin (2002) 
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the author mentions that “It appears that trading volume varies directly with the 
difference in investors opinions”. The volatility of the stock prices was measured 
comparing stock movements to those of the market indexes. The information 
obtained during the literature review was analyzed, as well as the different news 
obtained through the media. During this phase of the study the relationship 
between company news, investor perceptions and the selected company stock 
were analyzed. 
 
Selected Company Stocks and Data 
 
A group of ten company stocks were selected; all companies are from the 
technology-Internet sector. These ten companies were studied during the sample 
period of January 1998 to December 2000. The starting date is just around the 
beginning of the Internet bubble, and the ending date corresponds to the time 
when this bubble was coming to an end. The firms selected were as follows: 
 
1) Amazon.com (AMZN) 
2) America Online (AOL) 
3) Cisco Systems (CSCO) 
4) International Business Machines (IBM) 
5) Intel Corporation (INTL) 
6) Lucent Technologies (LU) 
7) Microsoft Corporation (MSFT) 
8) Siebel Systems (SEBL) 
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9) Sun Microsystems (SUNW) 
10) Yahoo! Inc. (YHOO)  
 
These companies were selected because there is copious information (historical 
news as well as prices, trading volumes, etc, during the period studied.) available 
about them in the market, they are actively traded stocks so these stock present 
a large circulation volume, which makes it easier to see changes in prices given 
the different information supplied. The historical prices of these company’s’ 
stocks were followed daily for the period mentioned before, and also the different 
price movements that occurred when different news about these companies was 
released. The daily historical prices were collected using the database provided 
by the Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago 
(CRSP), and the companies’ financial statements were provided by 
COMPUSTAT North America. A total of 302,440 observations (stock prices, 
trading volumes, holding period returns, betas, market return, etc) were analyzed 
as well as the company stocks quarterly financial statements for the years 1998, 
1999 and 2000. Since the prices of stocks are constantly moving, for the purpose 
of this study, only those changes of 3% (positive or negative) or more in stock 
prices were taken into account. The company news were collected utilizing 
EBSCO Business Complete, which is a large historical news database. This 
database provides historical news about companies; the information comes from 
different news sources such as periodicals (The Wall Street Journal, New York 
Times, etc) business magazines, business journals, and other business related 
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publications. A total of 3,665 news were gathered and examined for the years 
1998, 1999 and 2000. After sorting the stock prices and returns and eliminating 
those returns that represented changes between 3% and -3%, the total of 
observations was reduced to (3,001). 
The software SPSS was used for the statistical analysis in the study. 
  
Method Selected to Measure Changes in Stock Prices and Return 
 
The method selected to measure changes in stock prices and return was the 
Event Study methodology. This methodology measures the impact unexpected 
events have in a company’s stock price and return. This method allows 
appreciating better if the changes in prices were due to the financial strength of 
the company or if those changes were caused by the unexpected event. Utilizing 
event studies one can see the impact an unexpected event has over the price of 
the stock, and also we can measure what is the abnormal return, if any, observed 
around the date when the news was released. It is important to mention that a 
change in price, positive or negative, causes a change in the return of the 
company stock.  
 
The Event Studies methodology16 has been used by different researchers. As 
observed in the papers studied, the researchers take a sample of similar events 
that occurred in different companies at different times and determine how, on 
average, this event impacted the stock price. The event study techniques were 
                                                 
16
 The Event Study Web Page. http://web.mit.edu/doncram/www/eventstudy.html 
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first applied to stock splits, but quickly expanded into other areas. For example, 
Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985) studied stock market reactions 
to executive deaths and found that unexpected CEO deaths are associated with 
stock price decreases. Other examples in which this methodology has been 
applied are to study the effects of mergers and acquisitions, announcement of 
macroeconomic variables, new debt or equities issues, earnings 
announcements, the field of law and how the regulatory environment affects the 
value of the firm. There exist two basic models for modeling the normal return in 
order to investigate the abnormal return. These models are the constant mean 
return model and the market model. The constant mean return model assumes 
that the return of a security is constant over time, while the market model relates 
the return of the security with the return of the market. For this study the market 
model was chosen over the constant mean return model since it helps to reduce 
the variance of the abnormal return. 
 
The time line for an event study is as follows: 
 
             (Estimation window)                    (Event window)                         (Post-event window) 
 
 
 
 
      T0      T1                  0           T2           T3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Event Study market model is as follows (MacKinlay 1997): 
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(1)    Rit=αi + βi Rmt + εit    17 
E[εit] = 0   Var [εit] =  
Where Rit and Rmt are the period t returns on security j and the market portfolio, 
respectively, and εit is the zero mean disturbance term. αi,  βi  and  are the 
parameters of the market model. For the purpose of this study the CRSP equally 
weighted portfolio was used as the market portfolio. The estimation window 
observations can be expressed as a regression system,  
(2)  Ri = Xi θi +εi 
Where Ri = [RiT0+1 …… RiT1]  is an (L1 x 1) vector of the estimation windows 
returns, Xi = [ Rm] is an (L1 x 2) matrix with a vector of ones in the first column 
and the vector of market return observations Rm = [RmT0+1 …… RmT1]  in the 
second column, and θi = [αiβi]  (2x1) parameter vector. Under general 
conditions ordinary least squares is a consistent estimation procedure for the 
                                                 
17
 The sensitivity of a security to changes in the market (βi) is given by the following equation: 
   = , =  
 
Rmt ))2 
where,  and,   L1=T1 – T0 and L2=T2 – T1, Where L1 and L2 
are the length of the estimation window and the event window respectively. 
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market model parameters. The OLS estimators for the model parameters using 
an estimation window of L1 observations are, 
  (3)       =  
  (4)      
  (5)   
(6)         Var  
Thus let   be the (L2 x 1) sample vector of abnormal returns for security   
from the event window T1 +1 to T2. Using the market model we have that the 
abnormal return vector is: 
  (7)   =   – ( j + )  
(8)         =  
Where   = [RiT1+1 …… RiT2]’ is an (L2 x 1) vector of event window returns,  = 
[   ] is an (L2 x 2) matrix with a vector of ones in the first column and the 
vector of market return observations  = [RmT1+1 …… RmT2]’ in the second 
column, and  = [ ]’ (2x1) parameter vector estimate.   
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(9) E = E  
                = E  
         =0 
 (10)  
                                
          
I is the (L2xL2) identity matrix. From the equation above (9) we can see that that 
the abnormal return vector with an expectation of zero is unbiased. The 
covariance matrix of the abnormal return vector (10) has two parts, the first term 
in the sum is the variance due to the future disturbances and the second term is 
the additional variance due to the sampling error in . Under the null 
hypothesis H0, that the given event has no impact on the mean of variance of 
returns we can use equations (9, 10) and the joint normality of the abnormal 
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returns to draw inferences. Under H0 for the vector of event window sample 
returns we can get that 
   (11)      
In order to draw inferences for the event of interest, the abnormal return 
observations must be aggregated. The aggregation must be done through time 
and across securities. The individual securities abnormal return can be averaged 
using . Given a sample of N events, defining   as the sample average of 
the N abnormal return vectors, we have  
             (12)    =   
   (13) Var  
The elements of the average abnormal returns vector can be aggregated through 
time as follows. We can define ) as the cumulative average 
abnormal return from where T1 <   T2 and  represents an 
(L2 x 1) vector with ones in positions - T1 to  - T2 and zeroes elsewhere. 
Thus for the cumulative abnormal return we have:  
   (14)        ≡   
   (15) Var  
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To obtain   we can aggregate using the sample cumulative 
abnormal return for each security i. For N events we have: 
   (16)             
18
 
  (17) Var   
The cumulative abnormal return inferences can be drawn using, 
 
   (18)           
 
since under the null hypothesis the expectation of the abnormal returns is zero. 
Since is unknown, we can use as a 
consistent estimator. We can now proceed to test H0, which is expected to be 
zero (0) by using: 
 
                                                 
18
 Define as the cumulative abnormal return for security  from where T1 
<   T2 . Let  represent an (L2 x 1) vector with ones in positions - T1 to  - T2 and 
zeroes elsewhere. Then we have  ≡  and 
Var . Under H0 we have that 
. 
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   (19)  J1
 
 
If the result of J1 is different than zero (0) then the event being tested has an 
impact over the return of the stock, and therefore there exists abnormal returns.  
News Classification and Groups 
 
The news observed were classified in different categories described as follows: 
 
Financial News (NF)  
News that were pertaining to the internal finances of the company or its 
fundamental value, were classified as financial news (NF). For example, earning 
per share announcements, earning announcements, changes in sales, changes 
in company earnings, changes in dividend policies, dividend announcements, 
merger and acquisitions, issuing of additional stock, stock repurchase, stock 
splits, etc. In this group it was also taken into account improvements to stock 
recommendations and ratings by investment firms since these recommendations 
are mostly based on the fundamentals of the company.  
 
Research and Development News (RD) 
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News were classified as Research and Development if the information contained 
on the news was about the research and development of new products by the 
company. 
 
Marketing News (NM) 
This group was comprised of news about the launch and marketing of new 
products by the company. It also included projects done in conjunction with other 
companies to launch new products, strategic alliances, etc. For this type of news 
it was important to distinguish between the date of the news and the actual date 
of the product being launched to the market. 
 
Human Resources News (HR) 
News were classified as human resources news if the information conveyed by 
the news was about “downsizing” or employee layoffs, closing of manufacturing 
plants, hiring of new management or any other news concerning changes in 
management. 
 
The purpose of dividing the news in different categories is to observe which kind 
of news has a stronger impact on investors’ perception, stock prices and returns. 
As mentioned before, this should be of great help to future investors, investment 
professionals and researchers in general, because they can have a better grasp 
on which type of news and information affects their investments, stock prices and 
returns the most.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
The impact of news over the company stock prices, returns and changes in 
volumes are analyzed in this chapter. Also shown are the results of the impact of 
news over stock prices, returns and volumes divided by news categories. A 
company by company analysis is done to have a more comprehensive and 
rounder study. 
 
Amazon.com (AMZN) 
 
Amazon.com, company ticker19 AMZN, was the biggest Internet based sales 
provider during the period studied. The company sells a wide arrange of products 
that goes from books to Compact Discs, DVD’s and music in general. The 
company makes all it sales through the Internet, providing their customer the 
comfort of shopping without leaving their homes. During the studied period of 
January 1998 to December 2000 Amazon’s net income (loss) changed from 
$(46.427) million at the end of the fourth quarter of 1998 to $(545.14) million at 
the end of the fourth quarter 2000. Amazon.com increased its sales from 
$252.893 million to $972.36 million for the same period, as more and more 
consumers adventured to make their shopping through the Internet. Amazon had 
                                                 
19
 The company ticker is the symbol by which a company stock is identified in the stock market. 
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expenditures of $283.134 million at the end of the fourth quarter 2000 which 
represented an increase of $253.85 million from the same quarter in 1998. This 
increase was mainly due to an acquisition totalizing $222.85 million. Amazon’s 
stock had a book value of $1.70, and the lowest price the company stock 
registered in the market during the period studied was $15.187 (Dec. 21, 2000), 
and the highest price the stock registered during the same period was $354.93 
(Jan. 4, 1999). The stock beta20, as provided by CRSP, for the company stock 
was 1.782 for the year 1998, 1.811 for 1999 and 1.476 for 2000. The average 
daily trading volume for the period studied was 7,585,441. The lowest level of 
trading volume registered for the company stock during the period studied was 
103,712 and the highest trading volume registered during the same period was 
80,380,734.  
 
                                                 
20
 Beta is a measure of risk, it measure the sensitivity of the stock price to price movements in the market. 
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The company had a price-earnings ratio21 for this period of 111.11 (P/E Ratio). 
Amazon’s shares had a market capitalization of $5.57 billion for the period 
studied, and 357.14 million outstanding22 stocks at the end of the year 2000. It is 
interesting to notice that at the moment that Amazon experienced its highest 
stock price the market capitalization for the company stock was $57.28 billion 
The company had losses after taxes of ($1411.27 million), sales totaling 
$2761.98 million, total assets of $2135.16 million for the year ended Dec. 31 
2000. Amazon’s earnings per share (EPS) for the fourth quarter of the year 2000 
was ($1.53) If we look at the company stock’s p/e ratio we can see that the stock 
is overvalued, and that the stock’s market price is not supported by the 
company’s financial state. It should also be mentioned that when a company’s 
p/e ratio is high, it means that the public have a positive outlook or expectation 
                                                 
21
 The price earnings ratio is price divided by earnings. 
22
 Outstanding stock is the company shares that are in the hands of the public, or (issued stocks – treasury 
stocks) = outstanding stocks. 
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about the future financial performance of the firm. This probably indicates a 
positive expectation about the growth of Internet sales in the near future. We 
should also observe that the company stock beta is close to double that of the 
market23, this means that the company stock price is more volatile than the 
market. Even when these factors are taken into account, many investment 
banks, and investment firms such as Bank of America Securities, Merrill Lynch, 
Prudential Securities and others, had Amazon’s stock classified with a rating of 
“Strong Buy” during the period studied. This means that the investment 
professionals recommended the general public to buy Amazon’s stock. Let’s see 
the effect of news over the price, return, and volume on Amazon’s stock. 
On October 8 1998 a news was released (NM) on the Los Angeles Times (NM 
news group) in which it was reported that Amazon would face new competition 
from two rivals that would merge (N2K and CDnow), this merger would make this 
two companies the biggest sellers of music on the Internet. The day that this 
news was released Amazon’s stock experienced a drop in stock price from 
$93.4375 to $86.1875, given Amazon’s beta of 1.7829 and utilizing the equally 
weighted market return of - 3.764%, an abnormal return of negative 1.819% is 
observed. 
In this case the news released seemed to have a negative effect over Amazon’s 
stock. The trading volume for the same day was 5,099,507 shares On November 
18, 1998 it was published in the New York Times (NM) that Amazon would 
expand the merchandise selection offered through their Internet site. In addition 
to the products already offered, Amazon would also offer electronics, video 
                                                 
23
 The stock market beta, by definition, is always 1. 
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games and toys. The day the news was released Amazon’s stock price rose from 
$148.50 to $164, and a trading volume of 9,965,777 shares. The abnormal return 
observed during the day was 9.09%. 
The first of December, 1998 it was published in the New York Times (NM) that a 
deal between Amazon.com, Broadcast.com and Hoovers online was reached. 
The deal accorded that Broadcast and Hoover could place marketing ads in 
Amazon’s web site, and in turn Amazon could sell its products through Broadcast 
and Hoover. The day the news was released the company’s share price rose 
from $192 to $209.50, and the trading volume for the day was 7,949,560. The 
abnormal return observed for the day was 8.51%. 
On December 21,1998 it was published in different sources (NF)  that Amazon 
had a income of $147.8 million and that the expected sales for the company in 
five year should reach a level of $10 billion. The price of the company’s stock 
rose from $286.68 to $318.75. The trading volume for the day was 5,666,778 
shares. The abnormal return observed was 10.26%.  
On January 6 1999 it was published in The Wall Street Journal (NF) that during 
the Christmas season, Amazon’s total sales had triple, when compared to the 
previous year. A record $6 million was sold in one day and $250 million for the 
trimester. The article also stated that even with that level of sale Amazon.com 
had not reported earnings, and this was due to large investments in marketing 
and client services. The price of Amazon’s shares increased from $124.50 to 
$138, and the trading volume for the day was 18,445,464 shares. The abnormal 
return observed for the day was 7.3796%.  
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The Wall Street Journal released an article (NF) on January 27, 1999 that stated 
that Amazon.com and Ebay.com had gone through an amazing growth period 
during the months of October-December of the previous year, showing great 
optimism towards the company’s stock. Amazon’s share price increased to 
$125.625. and the trading volume for the day was 17,793,096 shares. The 
abnormal return observed was 9.40%. 
It is interesting how the abnormal return observed overcompensated for the 
decrease of the market, and provided a higher yield for Amazon’s stock. On 
February 24, 1999 an article was published by the New York Times (NF) that 
stated that Amazon.com had acquired 7% of GeoWorks shares, GeoWorks’ 
stock increased by 56%, according to the New York Times. Usually, when a 
company is acquired, the price of its’ shares increase. Amazon’s company stock 
experience a decrease from the previous day, from $115.1875 to $110.9375, and 
the observed trading volume for the day was 12,670,652. The abnormal return 
observed was – 3.73%. 
Barron’s published an article on March 1, 1999, that based on a previous article 
(NF) in which it was states that Amazon.com would buy 40% participation on 
Drugstore.com, investors started to sell Walgreens and Rite Aid stocks, both 
from the pharmacy retailing sector. Barron’s reported that apparently the general 
public perceived that the acquisition on the part of Amazon, could affect 
Walgreens and Rite Aid’s potential sales. The day this article was released 
Amazon’s share prices increased to $133, the trading volume for the day was 
9,849,507, and the abnormal return observed was 3.14%. 
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On March 10, 1999 it was reported (NM) in the Wall Street Journal that 
Amazon.com and Dell Computers would merge their web sites so that Amazon 
users could buy Dell’s products through Amazon’s website and vice versa. 
Amazon’s shares increased from $129.9375 to $137.125, and the trading volume 
for the day was 7,175,100. The abnormal return observed was 3.56%. 
An article was published in The New York Times (NM) on March 31, 1999, in 
which it was reported that Amazon.com was planning to offer auctions services 
to its consumers and small businesses. The article also stated that the auctions 
market through the Internet was a $20 billion business, and it was controlled by 
Ebay.com, the only real competitor that Amazon would face if it decided to enter 
to the auctions market. Amazon company stock price rose from $164.6875 to 
$172.1875, the trading volume during that day was 11,258,616 shares, and the 
abnormal return observed was 4.11%. 
On April 21, 1999 an article was published in different sources (NM) that 
Amazon.com was planning on entering the food retailing business through the 
Internet, the company would achieve this plan by investing in the company 
Homegrocer.com, which was a provider of groceries through the Internet. 
Amazon’s stock increases from $172 to $179.25 during the day. The trading 
volume for the day was 5,588,511 shares. The abnormal return observed was 
.0.9%.Apparently, most of the changes in prices for Amazon on this day, were 
mainly due to changes in overall market returns.  
On April 29, 1999 it was published (RH) on different periodicals that Amazon.com 
and Wal Mart had resolved a legal case out of court, the amount that Amazon 
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accorded to pay for the settlement was not disclosed. On that day Amazon’s 
stock declined from $193.50 to $168.25, and the trading volume for the day was 
23,420,352 shares. The abnormal return observed during the day was -14.46%. 
The New York Times published an article (NM) on June 15, 1999 in which it was 
stated that Amazon.com would enter in two new ventures, selling electronic 
products and toys through their web site. The projected sales for toys were $52 
million and the projected sales for electronics were $78 million. The price of the 
company increased from $92 to $96.50, and the trading volume for the day was 
9,289,223 shares. The abnormal return observed was 4.42% 
On September 14, 1999 an article was published (NF) in Barron’s in which it was 
commented that Merrill Lynch, one of the biggest investment banks in the United 
States, that it would incorporate to their portfolios, as well as sell corporate bonds 
from America Online and Amazon.com. It is interesting to point out that America 
Online corporate bonds at the time, had a credit rating of AA and Amazon’s 
corporate bonds had a credit rating of CCC24. The company’s stock price 
increased from $63.3125 to $66, the trading volume for the day was 8,886,067, 
and the abnormal return observed was 3.98% 
This financial news is very interesting because Merrill Lynch was giving the same 
level of confidence to Amazon’s corporate bonds as to the America Online funds, 
displaying their trust in the future of Amazon’s businesses, disregarding the fact 
that the company was not generating any revenue during the time. On 
                                                 
24
 Credit ratings are assigned to corporate bonds according to the company’s default and liquidity risk, 
Ratings usually range from AAA down to D, AAA being a high quality bond, with little credit risk. Bonds 
rated below BBB are considered “speculative bonds” or “junk bonds” given their higher default risk, this 
types of bonds pay higher interest rates to compensate for the higher risk being assumed by the investor. 
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September 29, 1999 it was published (RH) in the Los Angeles Times that on that 
same day Amazon.com would invite independent salesmen to offer their 
products through the company web site, creating a virtual shopping center. 
According to the Los Angeles Times, the article published caused investors to 
demand high quantities of Amazon’s shares in the financial market, causing an 
increase in stock prices from $65.875 to $80.75. The article stated that Amazon 
would charge interested vendors $9.99 monthly, to allow them to sell their 
products through Amazon’s web site. The trading volume for the day was 
80,380,734. The abnormal return observed during the day was 22.70%. 
On January 6, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (NF) that Amazon.com had 
experienced an increase in revenues when compared to the previous year, but 
the article also stated that Amazon still had serious problems related to inventory 
costs. Amazon stock price decreased from $69.75 to $65.5625. The trading 
volume registered for the day was 18,977,420 shares, and the abnormal 
observed on this day was -7.438%. 
On January 11, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (NF) that Kozmo.com 
would get $100 million by a group of investors led by Amazon.com. Kozmo.com 
used to deliver snacks, movies and other items through the Internet. Amazon’s 
share price decreased during the day by 3.52%, to $66.75. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 10,638,588 shares, and the abnormal return observed 
during the day was -3.396%  
Interactive Week reported (NM) on January 31, 2000 the details of different 
partnerships formed between Amazon and different Internet companies, as well 
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as the advantages derived by Amazon from such partnerships. Amazon’s shares 
experienced an increase in price from $61.875 to $64.5625. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 10,875,621 shares and the abnormal return observed 
was 4.68%. 
On February 3, 2000 it was reported (NF) by the Wall Street Journal that 
Amazon’s officials had predicted narrower deficits for the year 2000. Amazon’s 
shares increased to $84.1875, a 21.24% rise. The trading volume registered for 
the day was 44,259,436 shares and the abnormal return observed was 18.47%. 
The increase in price experienced by Amazon’s shares was very impressive, 
considering the fact that the company had not reported revenues, and the no real 
“new news” was being released, only the opinion of high officials in the company. 
Apparently investors perceived the news and the official’s comments as a 
positive signal about the firm’s future judging from the increase in trading volume 
level. On February 4 2000, an article was published (NF) in the Wall Street 
Journal which stated that on previous days Amazon’s share price had 
experienced a very high increase, and it seemed that investors had ignored the 
problems and losses that the company had experienced on their loan portfolio. 
On that day Amazon’s share price decreased from $84.1875 to $78.5626. The 
trading volume for the day was 11,150,410 shares and the abnormal return 
observed during the day was -8.44%. 
On July 27, 2000 it was reported (NF) in different financial news sources that 
Amazon.com had fell short of investors’ revenue expectations. The news also 
expressed analyst’s concerns about the future of the company and its slowing 
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growth. On this day the company stock price decreased by 13% from $36.0625 
to $31.375. The trading volume for the day was 23,771,596 shares and the 
abnormal return observed was -11.77%. 
On August 14, 2000 an article (NM) was published in Info World, in which it was 
reported that Amazon.com and Toys R’ Us were starting a joint venture where 
Amazon would sell Toys R’ Us toys trough its web site. On this day the 
company’s share increased in price by 3.52% to $34.875. The trading volume for 
the day was 6,325,170 shares and the observed abnormal return was 1.91%. 
Publishers Weekly reported (NF) on August 21, 2000 on the decreased value of 
Amazon’s partnering strategy due to the bankruptcy liquidation filed by its partner 
Living.com. Amazon’s share price decreased on this day by 3.84% to $37.50, the 
trading volume for the day was 4,098,045 shares and the observed abnormal 
return was -4.918%. 
On September 21, 2000 the Wall Street Journal commented on an article (NM) 
how the method used by Amazon.com to become one of the Web’s largest 
retailers had won the loyalty of millions of consumers, and how the model 
created was still the best one around. On this date the company stock price 
increased from $37.50 to $40.0625. The trading volume for the day was 
7,354,056 shares and the observed abnormal return during the day was 7.07%. 
Interactive Week reported (NM) on October 2, 2000 about the losses of members 
of the Amazon Commerce Network (ACN), how the bankruptcy of Gear.com and 
Living.com had affected the company and how a renegotiation of a deal with 
Drugstore.com could help Amazon’s future. On this date the company stock price 
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decreased by 6.67% to $35.875. The trading volume for the day was 5,565,627 
shares and the observed abnormal return was -5.69%. 
On October 11, 2000 it was reported (NM) on the Wall Street Journal that 
Amazon and Sotheby’s Holdings would close their co-branded web site that sells 
art and collectibles online. The article also informed about the different problems 
that plagued the web site. On this day the company stock price decreased from 
$30.0625 to $27.8125. The trading volume registered for the day was 7,960,004 
shares and the observed abnormal return was -6.79%. 
Computer World reported on November 13, 2000 about changes (NM) in 
Amazon’s privacy policy, and how these changes raised concerns on its 
customers. On this day Amazon’s share price decreased by 7.484% to $27.8125. 
The trading volume registered for the day was 8,450,011 shares and the 
observed abnormal return was -6.385%. 
On November 27, 2000 eWeek reported (NM) how consumers were receiving 
unsolicited electronic mail or spam mail, from Amazon.com. On this date 
Amazon’s stock price decreased by 3.24% to $28. The trading volume for the 
day was 6,478,294 shares and the abnormal return observed during the day was 
-3.32%. 
Wireless Week announced (NM) on December 4, 2000 the opening of the 
wireless online store by Amazon.com, the article also detailed the services that 
would be offered through the web site. On this day the company share price 
increased by 7.86% to $26.5625. The trading volume during the day was 
8,358,607 shares and the observed abnormal return was 8.71%. 
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The Wall Street Journal reported (NM) on December 5, 2000 about different 
complaints received by the United States Federal Trade Commission against the 
revised customer privacy policy of Amazon.com. On this date the company share 
price decreased from $26.5625 to $25.375, the trading volume registered for the 
day was 10,124,085 shares and the abnormal return observed was -9.302%. 
The Wall Street Journal reported (NM) on December 21, 2000 that Amazon.com 
had opened a retail outlet on its web site to sell close-out and overstock items. 
On this day Amazon’s stock price decreased from $16.6875 to $15.1875, the 
trading volume for the day was 8,960,905 shares and the abnormal return 
observed during the day was -9.017%. 
America Online (AOL) 
 
America Online, company ticker AOL, it later changed to TWX once the merger 
with Time Warner was finalized25, used to provide interactive services, Internet 
technology, and e-commerce services. The company operated during the studied 
period two Internet providers that gave worldwide services, America Online and 
CompuServe, as well as other lesser known Internet companies. For the quarter 
ended on December 30 2000, the company had net income of $338 million. Total 
sales for the same period were $1929 million. This increase from the previous 
quarter was mainly due to an increase of subscribers to the services offered 
combined with a decrease of marketing costs. The highest company stock price 
registered during the period studied was $175.75 (Jan. 29, 1999) and the lowest 
company stock price registered was $34.8 (Dec. 29, 2000). The average daily 
                                                 
25
 The company merged with Time Warner Inc. after 2000.. 
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trading volume for the period studied was 14,679,662. The lowest level of trading 
volume registered during the same period was 801,900 (Jan. 23, 1998) and the 
highest trading volume observed during this period was 94,586,896 (Jan. 11, 
2000)  
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The P/E ratio of the company during this period was 232. The company stock 
beta for the year 1998 was 2.3107, for 1999 the beta was 2.37253, and for the 
year 2000 the company stock beta was 1.33823. The company had 2316.494 
million common stocks outstanding, at the end of the fourth quarter of the year 
2000. AOL’s total assets for the year ended December 30, 2000 was $10.673 
billion, its sales at the end of the year 2000 were $6.886 billion, the company had 
expenditures of $1.941 billion, a pretax income of $2.014, and a net income of 
$1.232 billion for the same period. The return on assets (ROA) for the company 
during the same period was 11.54% and the return on equity (ROE) was 
19.99%.. The ROA and ROE for the quarter ended on December 2000 were 
3.16% and 5.48% respectively. America Online had a market capitalization for 
the same period of $80.613 billion and during the same period it was one of the 
few Internet companies that were actually producing revenues. AOL’s (EPS) for 
the last quarter of the year 2000 was $0.15, and the company had total sales for 
the same period of $1.91 billion. It should be noticed that the company beta was 
more than twice the market beta, which makes this stock a risky one, based on 
its volatility. Even taking into account the high company beta, and its high P/E 
ratio, the company stock was given a “Strong Buy” recommendation by JP 
Morgan and CIBC World Markets. The high stock price and its P/E ratio were due 
to the fact that during this period Internet subscribers were expected to double or 
even triple in the subsequent years. Since America Online was one of the largest 
Internet providers in the world it was expected that the company Internet 
subscribers would increase at the same rate as the Internet total subscribers. 
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Let’s see the effect of news over the price, return, and volume on America Online 
stock during the studied period of January 2, 1998 to December 29, 2000. 
On October 8, 1998 an article was published in The Wall Street Journal (NM) that 
America Online (AOL) was expecting to start providing its services in Australia. 
The stock price of the company decreased from $92 to $85.50, the trading 
volume for the day was 10,778,000, and the abnormal return observed during the 
day was 0.8%. 
In this case it is interesting to notice that the changes observed in the company 
stock price were mainly caused by changes in the market return, and the high 
company beta of 2.3107. On March 25 1999 it was published (NF) in The New 
York Times that Ebay.com would pay AOL $75 million for the rights to advertise 
its services through AOL’ web site. AOL’s stock price increased from $117.125 to 
$126.50, the trading volume for the day was 23,544,592 shares. The abnormal 
return observed for this day was 3.65%. 
On April 5, 1999 an article was published (NF) in Business Week in which it was 
reported how they expected for AOL to be the next Internet giant. It was also 
reported that AOL, at that moment, had 16 million subscribers, and how 
Netscape, an AOL company, was the leader in Internet software. AOL’s share 
price increased from $144.50 to $166.9375, the trading volume for the day was 
26,786,896 shares and the abnormal return observed was 9.31% 
The New York Times published an article (NF) on April 7, 1999 where it was 
reported that AOL had acquired When Inc., an Internet company that provided 
virtual calendars. The amount which AOL paid for the acquisition was not 
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disclosed. AOL’s share price decreased to $158, and the trading volume for the 
day was 33,010,288 shares. The abnormal return observed was -7.43%. 
Apparently investors did not perceived the acquisition as a good investment, 
driving them to sell AOL’s shares and increasing the trading volume for the day 
by nearly 7,000,000 shares, when compared to the previous day. It is interesting 
to point out that When Inc. had not registered revenue up to the point of the 
acquisition. On April 22, 1999 it was published (NF) in the New York Times that 
Sprint would buy $90 million in AOL’s shares. AOL’s stock price increased from 
$142.75 to $148.6875, the trading volume registered during the day was 
25,234,896 shares, and the abnormal return observed was .96%. 
It is important to point out that on this study the vast majority of the companies 
being acquired, even if the acquisition was only partial, experienced an increase 
in stock prices, as it is observed in this example. On June 1, 1999 it was reported 
(NF) by different sources that AOL would pay $400 million for the acquisition of 
Spinner Networks and Null Soft Inc’s shares, both providers of music through the 
Internet. AOL’s stock price decreased to $113.125. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 17,456,688 and the abnormal return registered was     
-6.29%. 
On June 14, 1999 an article was published (NM) in Business Week that AOL 
would face strong competition from Freeserve, a British Internet company that 
offered its Internet services for free. The article reported that in less than a year 
Freeserve had already amassed a total of 1.1 million users, more than what AOL 
was able to attract during the same year. AOL’s stock price decreased to $90.50, 
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from $99.50, the trading volume during the day was 40,113,392, a total of nearly 
7,000,000 more shares traded than the previous day. The abnormal return 
observed during the day was -8.91%. 
On August 13, 1999 different (NM) news sources reported that AOL and Novell 
Inc. would join forces, making their respective Internet services compatible with 
each other. AOL’s stock price increased from $92.375 to $96.875. The trading 
volume registered for the day was 14,528,599 shares and the observed 
abnormal return was .04%. 
Interactive Week reported on September 27 1999 (NF) that EarthLink and 
MindSpring would merge in order to compete with AOL. The article also stated 
that even with the merger the competition that the new company would represent 
to AOL was not very significant, since AOL was well established and better 
known to the general public than its competitors. On that day AOL stock 
increased from $97.50 to $101.125 and the trading volume registered for the day 
was 25,721,696 shares. The abnormal return observed was .79%. 
On September 28, 1999 different news sources reported (NM) that AOL was 
preparing to launch its services in Hong Kong; this would serve as the entry point 
to the Asian market. On that day AOL’s shares increased from $101.125 to 
$109.875. The volume increased by a little more than 5,000,000 from the 
previous day registered volume, to 30,913,088 shares. The abnormal return 
registered during that day was 8.37%. 
Apparently the news was well received by the investors as they saw the 
tremendous opportunity that having access to the Asian market would present to 
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AOL’s future. On October 6, 1999 different news sources reported (NM) that AOL 
would launch its 5.0 version of their Internet access software. The new software 
would permit users to access the Internet trough cellular phones and televisions 
prepared for Internet access. AOL’s stock increased from $113.50 to $120, the 
trading volume for the day was 21,248,288 and the abnormal return observed 
was 2.90%. 
On January 11, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (NF) on the effects of a 
possible merger between Microsoft and AT&T on America Online and its merger 
with Time Warner. O this date AOL’s stock price decreased by 10.95% from the 
previous day to $64. The trading volume registered for the day was 94,586,896 
shares and the observed abnormal return was -11.88%. 
The Wall Street Journal reported (NF) on February 23, 2000 on the agreement of 
HomeGrocer.com to pay for the marketing of its grocery-delivery service to AOL 
members. On this date AOL’s stock price increased by 16.03% from the previous 
day to a price of $57.43. The trading volume registered during the day was 
43,471,696 shares and the observed abnormal return was 13.55%. 
The Wall Street Journal reported (NM) on March 13, 2000 about the instant 
messaging service offered by AOL called Buddy List. The article also commented 
on how instant messages were making inroads into corporate call centers and 
customer support operations. It was also commented about the competitive 
advantages that AOL had over its competitors in the field mentioned. On this day 
AOL’s stock price increased by 3.81% from the previous day to a price of $61.25. 
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The trading volume registered for the day was 30,246,896 shares, and the 
observed abnormal return was 3.144%. 
On May 15, 2000 it was reported (NM) on Internet World how AOL exemplified 
the wireless and broadband revolution. On this day AOL stock price increased by 
6.10% from the previous day to $58.625. The trading volume registered for the 
day was 12,996,699 shares and the observed abnormal return during the day 
was 3.72%. 
The Wall Street Journal reported (NM) on August 24, 2000 on a strategic alliance 
formed by AOL, Adero Inc. and Inktomi Corp. to install Adero’s traffic monitoring 
software on servers throughout the Internet. On this day AOL’s stock price 
increased by 3.45% from the previous day to $59.875. The trading volume for the 
day was 11,018,599 shares and the observed abnormal return was .09%. 
On November 6, 2000 Wireless Week reported (NM) on the potential role of 
instant messaging (IM) in businesses and the predicted increase of IM users by 
2004. On this day AOL’s share price increased by 4.58% from the previous day 
to $55.86. The trading volume registered for the day was 13,266,500 shares and 
the observed abnormal return was 2.77%. 
On November 21, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (NM) on a deal signed 
by Time Warner and Earthlink, an Internet provider, that would allow Earthlink to 
offer its services on Time Warners high speed cable system. On this day AOL’s 
stock price decreased by 8.68% from the previous day to $43. The trading 
volume registered for the day was 16,425,400 shares and the abnormal return 
observed on the day was -8.88%. 
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This news might have come as a surprise to AOL’s investors, since a merger 
was being discussed at the time between AOL and Time Warner, so it was a 
mixed signal when Time Warner decided to allow a AOL competitor to use its 
resources. The investor acted accordingly, losing some trust on the strength of 
AOL share price, and selling the stock. On December 14, 2000 The Wall Street 
Journal reported that AOL and Time Warner had signed an agreement with the 
United States Federal Trade Commission under which the two companies 
committed to provide cable access to other Internet companies, this helped to 
bring the possible merger between the two companies a little closer. On this day 
AOL’s stock price increased by 3.19% from the previous day to $50. The trading 
volume registered for the day was 16,798,400 shares and the abnormal return 
observed during the day was 3.23%. 
 
 
Cisco Systems (CSCO) 
 
Cisco Systems, company ticker CSCO, was the world leader, during the period 
studied, in the creation of system networks for the Internet. These networks 
created by Cisco helped connect individual computers to other networks of 
computers. This helped users to access or transfer information without time 
constraints, place of access, or the type of computer being used26. Cisco also 
provides a wide array of product utilized in the creation of information access 
networks. Cisco products can be customized to each client’s needs and are sold 
                                                 
26
 Source Cisco Fact Sheet at www.Cisco.com 
93 
in 115 countries. The company’s income has risen from $69 million in 1990 to 
$2.66 billion at the end of 2000.In the trimester ended December 1999 Cisco’s 
income was $796 million. During the period studied the company stock price 
registered a low of $36.50 (Dec. 20, 2000) and the highest price observed during 
the same period was $144.375 (Mar. 22, 2000). The highest level of trading 
volume for Cisco’s stock observed during the studied period was 1,730 million 
shares (Dec. 20, 2000) and the lowest level of trading volume registered for the 
same period was 4,783,215 shares (Apr. 22, 1998). The average daily trading 
volume for Cisco’s stock during this period was 26,733,876. 
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The company stock had a beta of 1.29804 for the year 1998, a beta of 1.29288 
for the year 1999 and a beta of 0.8957 for the year 2000. The stock market 
capitalization for Cisco’s shares during this period was $273.02 billion and the 
company had 7.138 billion shares outstanding. The book value of the company 
stock was $2.40 and the P/E ratio during the period studied was 347.72. Cisco 
had total assets at the end of the year 2000 of $32.870 billion and total sales of 
$2.210 billion. The company achieved a return on assets (ROA) of 2.42% for the 
quarter ended on December 2000, a return on equity (ROE) of 3.00% and (EPS) 
of $0.11 for the same period. The financial figures for Cisco for the year ended 
December 30, 2000 were as follows, Expenses of $7.283 billion, total sales of 
$18.928 billion, pretax income of $4.343 billion, and net income of $2.668 billion, 
the year end ROA was 8.11% and the year end ROE was 10.06%. During the 
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period studied the company stock had a “Buy’ recommendation from JP Morgan. 
Let’s see Cisco’s stock price movement, as well as the changes in return and 
volume during the period of January 2 1998 to December 30 2000.  
On February 1, 1999 it was reported (RD) in Fortune magazine that Cisco was 
expected to increase its sales by integrating its products to everyday home 
appliances like televisions and microwave ovens. Cisco’s share price increased 
to $115, the trading volume for the day was 26,068,485 shares and the abnormal 
return observed during the day was 3.14%. 
On February 9, 1999 different news sources reported (RD) that Cisco and 
Motorola would join forces to develop and launch wireless access to the Internet. 
On this day Cisco’s stock suffered a decrease in price to $95.9375, the trading 
volume for the day was 21,406,555 and the abnormal return observed was -
.4458%  
The decline in price might have been cause by the fact that in order to make this 
venture happen Cisco would have to invest $1 billion. Probably the investors did 
not perceive it was the appropriate moment to make such a large disbursement. 
The New York Times reported (NF) on June 30, 1999 that Cisco was intending to 
buy $435 million in shares of StratumOne Communications, a semiconductor 
technology developer. Cisco’s intention was to utilize StratumOne’s technologies 
in order to develop a new generation of high velocity computer networks. Cisco’s 
share price increased to $64.4375 during the day, and registered a trading 
volume of 30,116,422. The abnormal return observed during the day was 1.18%. 
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On January 24, 2000 Interactive Week reported (NM) on the pressure by Cisco 
Systems to small vendors of virtual private networks and the views from different 
small vendors. On this date Cisco’s stock price decreased by 5.369% to 
$109.0625. The trading volume for the day was 22,302,406 shares and the 
observed abnormal return was -5.498. 
PC Week reported on January 31, 2000 that Cisco Systems and Novell Inc. were 
developing (RD) and planning to release directory enabled networking hardware 
configuration and management applications. This gave consumer the advantage 
of managing their data more efficiently. On this date Cisco’s share price 
increased by 5.41% from the previous day to $109.50. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 34,083,296 shares and the observed abnormal return 
was 5.31%. 
On April 3, 2000 Electronic Week reported (NF) about two acquisitions made by 
Cisco. On this date the company stock price decreased by 5.65% from the 
previous day to $72.9375. The trading volume registered for the day was 
62,668,909 shares and the observed abnormal return was -5.59%. 
On May 8, 2000 eWeek reported (NF) on Cisco’s intentions to acquire Internet 
company Arrowpoint Communications for an undisclosed amount. On this date 
Cisco’s stock price decreased by 7.38% from the previous day to $62.75. The 
registered trading volume for the day was 69,894,927 shares and the observed 
abnormal return was -7.47%. 
Interactive Week reported (NF) on July 31, 2000 on the list of company rankings 
regarding their earnings for the first quarter of the year 2000. It was reported that 
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Cisco was among the leaders in the rankings. On this date the company stock 
price increased by 4.17% from the previous day to $65.4375. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 51,642,280 shares and the observed abnormal return 
was 3.96%. 
On December 11, 2000 it was reported (NF) in Interactive Week about a rumored 
merger between Ciena and Cisco Systems. On this date the company stock price 
increased by 4.65% from the previous day to $54.8125. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 79,357,851 shares and the observed abnormal return 
was 4.39%. 
 
International Business Machines (IBM) 
 
International Business Machines, company stock ticker IBM, provides high 
technology solutions, systems, products, services, computer programs and 
financing to its clients through the use of advanced information technology. For 
the trimester ended on December 2000 the company’s net income was $2.67 
billion. This was as a result of an increase in the sale of personal computers, an 
increased in its customer base and revenue of $1.61 billion in the sale of IBM 
Global Network to AT&T. The highest registered stock price during the period 
studied was $246 (May 13, 1999) and the lowest observed price during the same 
period was $81.5625 (Dec. 21, 2000). The average daily trading volume for 
IBM’s stock during the period studies was 6,159,548. The lowest level of trading 
volume for the same period was 65,835 (Jan. 22, 1998) and the highest level of 
trading volume observed was 69,444,784 (Oct. 21, 1999).  
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IBM’s had a stock market capitalization of $148.146 billion and had 1.742 billion 
shares outstanding.  The stock’s book value was $10.34 and the P/E ratio was 
55.92. IBM had total assets of $88.349 billion at the end of the year 2000, as well 
as total sales of $25.616 billion. The return on assets (ROA) for the company 
was 3.02% for the quarter ended on December 2000, the return on equity (ROE) 
was 13.10% and (EPS) was $1.48 during the same period. For the year ended 
December 30, 2000 IBM,s financials were as follows, expenditures totaling $22.9 
billion, total sales of $88.396 billion, pretax income of $11.534 billion, and net 
income of $8.093 billion. The ROA and ROE for the same period were 9.16% 
and 39.7% respectively. IBM stock presented a high trading volume during the 
period studied, but it is not considered a speculative stock. Even though the 
company is a high technology firm, it has already reached a business maturity 
state this makes the company stock unattractive for speculative investors, since 
the revenue margin is not as large as other less mature Internet companies. IBM 
is also one of the “Blue Chips27” that make up the Dow Jones Industrial Index, it 
is considered a stable company, and therefore no drastic price changes are 
expected. The P/E ratio for IBM’s stock was 22.19 during this period which is not 
large when compared to the other companies analyzed in this study. IBM’s stock 
beta for the year 1998 was 0.86276, for the year 1999 the beta was 0.8907 and 
for the year 2000 the company stock beta was 0.48644. It is interesting to 
mention that IBM’s stock had been given a “Neutral” recommendation by 
                                                 
27
 Blue Chips is the name given to the companies that make up the Dow Jones Index,  these companies are 
large and their stock prices are stable. 
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Prudential and Merrill Lynch. Let’s take a look at the company’s stock price 
movement, return and volume changes during the period studied.  
On April 26, 1999, The Wall Street Journal published an article (NF) in which it 
was reported that IBM’s income had increased by 42%. This increase in income 
was mainly due to an increase in sales. The company’s revenue was $1 billion 
over previous expectations. IBM’s stock price increased to $209.875, and the 
trading volume during the day was 9,333,000. The abnormal return observed 
during the day was 4.46%. 
The New York Times reported (NF) on June 7, 1999 that IBM had received a 
contract from Acer Group for their services, for a total amount of $8 billion. On 
this day IBM’s share price increased by 3.8% to $120.50. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 6,663,899 shares, and the abnormal return observed 
was 3.08%. 
On June 21, 1999 The Wall Street Journal reported (RD) that Charles Schwab 
and IBM would develop together a new system to be used by Schwas to manage 
more efficiently stock transaction and sales volumes. During that day IBM’s share 
price increased by 3.31% to $124.75. The trading volume during the day was 
6,466,299 shares and the abnormal return observed was 2.745%. 
On August 11 the Wall Street Journal reported (NM) that IBM was planning to 
launch an Internet based travel agency. The plan was to create a virtual platform 
where airline companies could market and sell their products. On this date IBM’s 
stock price increased by 3.3% to $123.3125 and the trading volume registered 
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for the day was 5,543,000. The abnormal return observed during the day was 
2.41%. 
The New York Times published an article (NF) on October 21, 1999 that IBM was 
planning to stop selling their personal computers in conventional computer 
stores, and would only offer their Aptiva personal computers through the Internet. 
IBM’s share price decreased by 14.95% from the previous day to $91. The 
trading volume for the day was a very high 69,444,784 shares, and the abnormal 
return during this date was -14.796%. 
The news had a very big impact on investor trading behavior, judging by the high 
trading volume. IBM’s sale of personal computers at the time totaled $2 billion, 
and apparently investors were concerned that IBM’s revenue would be affected 
by the decision. On January 3, 2000 PC Week reported (NF) on the 
reorganization of IBM software divisions. The article also reviewed the move of 
IBM networking and Java lines into different divisions and the creation of 
Solutions and Integration unit. On this day the company stock price increased by 
7.18% from the previous day to $115.625. The trading volume registered for the 
day was 10,346,799 shares and the observed abnormal return was 6.88%. 
PC Week reported (NM) on March 27, 2000 about IBM’s planned introduction of 
its midrange F80, H80 and M80 RS/6000 servers that contain its Pulsar copper 
chips. The article also reported on the features of the products and the enhanced 
capabilities provided. On this date IBM’s shares increased by 4.42% from the 
previous day to $126.875. The trading volume registered for the day was 
11,862,899 shares and an observed abnormal return of 4.38%. 
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On April 17, 2000 an article was published (NM) by Interactive Week on which it 
was reported on the growing market for Internet server appliances. The article 
also commented on the Internet server appliances launched by Dell Computer 
and IBM, and the opportunities faced on this growing market. On this day IBM’s 
share price increased by 6.54% to $111.875. The trading volume registered for 
the day was 9,959,799 shares and the observed abnormal return was 6.85%.  
On June 5, 2000 it was reported (NM) in Info World on the preparation of IBM to 
launch its e2open.com, a global Internet business to business exchange for the 
telecommunications and electronics industries. On this day IBM’s company stock 
price increased by 3.688% from the previous day to $112.437. The trading 
volume registered for the day was 7, 281,299 shares and the observed abnormal 
return for the day was 3.14%. 
The Wall Street Journal reported (NF) on July 20, 2000 that IBM had beaten the 
earnings forecast set by the market despite a 19% drop in profits. On this day 
IBM, stock price increased by 13.043% from the previous day and the trading 
volume registered for the day was 22,927,888 shares. The observed abnormal 
return was 12.65%. 
Apparently the investors gave a lot of weight to the fact that IBM had beaten 
market expectations even after experiencing a significant drop in profits. On 
October 18, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (NF) on the disappointing 3% 
revenue growth achieved by IBM during the third quarter of the year 2000. On 
this day IBM’s stock price experienced a sharp decline of 15.54% from the 
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previous day, to a price of $95.43. The trading volume registered for the day was 
29,776,496 shares and the observed abnormal return was -15.15%.  
Even when IBM reported a growth in revenues for the third quarter of the year, 
investors perceived this increase as minimal, or at least less than what they 
expected. This reaction on the part of investors was made evident by their 
trading behavior during the day, selling IBM shares. On November 13, 2000 
eWeek reported (NM) on Bank of America and Chase Manhattan Bank’s 
partnership with IBM Corp. to form Viewpointe Archive Services, a check image 
archive company. The article also commented on the differences between 
Viepointe’s offerings from other check imaging companies. On this day IBM’s 
stock price increased by 4.77% to $97.437, the trading volume registered for the 
day was 8,684,899 shares and the abnormal return observed during the day was 
5.23%. 
On December 18, 2000 Info World reported (NM) on IBM’s plans to transform 
itself into a first-tier player in the on demand computer services market targeting 
utility companies, and the advantage of the company over its competitors. On 
this date IBM’s stock price increased by 3.06% from the previous day to $90.50. 
The registered trading volume for the day was 7,693,700 shares and the 
observed abnormal return was 3.38%. 
 
Intel Corporation (INTC) 
 
Intel Corporation, company stock ticker INTC, designs, manufactures and sells 
different personal computer components, and other products related to computer 
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integration. Intel’s main products are computer semiconductors and processors. 
For the trimester ended on December 2000, the company’s net income was 
$2.193 billion. This was mainly due to a high sales volume of computer 
microprocessors and a reduction in production costs. The highest stock price 
observed during the period studied was $44.90 (Feb. 22, 2000) and the lowest 
stock price during the same period was $6.781 (Dec. 26, 2000). The average 
daily trading volume for Intel’s stock during this period was 247,061. The highest 
level of trading volume observed was 1,734,771 (Apr. 22, 1999) and the lowest 
level of trading volume registered during the same period was 39,973 (May 22, 
1998). 
 
105 
 
The company had a stock beta of 1.39833 in the year 1998, in the year 1999 the 
company’s stock had a beta of 1.14683, and in the year 2000 the beta was 
0.63344. Intel’s stock market capitalization for this period studied was $51.667 
billion, and the highest market capitalization observed between 1998 and the 
year 2000 was $149.696 billion. At the end of the year 2000 the company had 
3.31 billion stocks outstanding. The book value of the company stock was $7.70 
and it had a P/E ratio of 23.29 during the period studied. Intel had total assets of 
$47.945 billion at the end of the fourth quarter of the year 2000 and total sales of 
$8.702 billion, the company’s return on assets (ROA)  for the quarter ended on 
December 2000 was 4.57%, the return on equity (ROE) of 5.87% and the (EPS) 
was $0.33 for the same period. The yearend numbers for the year ended on 
December 30, 2000 were: expenditures totaling $8.986 billion, total sales of 
$33.726 billion, pretax income of $15.141 billion and net income of $10.535 
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billion. The return on assets and return on equity for the same period were 
21.97% and 28.22% respectively. Intel is also a well established company. 
Although it doesn’t have the state of business maturity that IBM has, is a lot more 
solid than the majority of the tech-stocks being traded during the period studied. 
During this period Bank of America Securities and Solomon Smith Barney had 
given the company’s stock a “Buy” recommendation. Let’s see the impact news 
had over the company’s stock price, return and volume. 
On January 22, 1999 the New York Times reported (NF) that Intel was going to 
acquire $100 million in Samsung’s corporate bonds. The bonds were convertible 
to roughly 1% of Samsung’s company stocks. On this day Intel’s stock price 
decreased from $25.125 to $24. The trading volume for the day was 116,019 and 
the abnormal return observed was -4.389%. 
On April 6, 1999 it was reported (RD) in USA Today that Intel was testing a new 
direct sales system to be applied on their web site. On this day Intel’s share price 
decreased by 4.54% to $15.09. The trading volume for the day was 163,492 and 
the abnormal return observed was -4.082%. 
On April 16, 1999 different sources reported (NF) that Intel’s income had 
increased by 57% and the company revenue had increased by 18%, this was 
due to the successful sales level attained by their microchip processor Pentium 
III. The share price on that day increased by 8.33% to $14.625. The trading 
volume for the day was 291,172, and the abnormal return observed was 6.90%. 
The New York Times reported (NF) on May 7, 1999, that Intel had acquired $15 
million in Silicon Valley Group stocks. On this day Intel’s share price decreased 
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by 3.16% to $13.375. The trading volume registered for the day was 105,517, 
and the abnormal return observed was -3.79%. 
On January 24, 2000 Electronic News reported (RD) on the effort of a group led 
by Intel Corp. to develop dynamic access memory technology, and the impact 
this technology could have in the markets. On this day Intel’s stock price 
increased by 5.50% from the previous day to $26.37. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 483,270 shares and the abnormal return observed 
was 5.60%. 
PC Week reported (NM) on January 31, 2000 that Intel Corp. was ready to 
release computer hardware and software products designed to make it easier for 
server and workstation makers to add RAID computer networks to their products. 
The article also commented on the advantages to be offered by such products. 
On this date Intel’s stock price increased by 6.43% to $30. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 277,531 shares and the observed abnormal return 
was 6.71%. 
On February 14, 2000 Electronic News reported (RD) on the faster 
microprocessors developed by AMD and Intel Corp, as well as the success on 
the part of Intel in conditioning users about the benefits of higher processor 
speed. On this day Intel’s share price increased by 3.68% from the previous day 
to $36.93. The trading volume registered for the day was 463,466 shares and the 
observed abnormal return was 3.16%. 
On April 10, 2000 Electronic News reported (NF) on the acquisition of software 
development tool maker Kuck and Associates by Intel Corp. On this day Intel’s 
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stock price decreased by 4.53%, the trading volume registered during the day 
was 254,039 shares and the observed abnormal return during the day was          
-3.518.  
Electronic News reported (NM) on April 24, 2000 on the efforts of Intel to address 
the shortage of Pentium III microprocessors and the opportunity that this 
presented for Advanced Micro Devices, Intel’s closest competitor. On this day 
Intel’s stock price decreased by 7.60% from the previous day to a price of 
$20.50. The trading volume registered for the day was 738,040 shares and the 
observed abnormal return was -6.55%. 
On July 3, 2000 Electronic News reported (NM) on the advantages Advanced 
Micro Device Inc. (AMD) AMD Duron chip had over Intel’s Celeron chip in the 
competition for the personal computer sub market. On this day Intel’s stock price 
decreased by 5.05% from the previous day to a price of $15.25. The trading 
volume registered for the day was 156,809 shares and the observed abnormal 
return was 5.689%. 
On July 10, 2000 eWeek reported (NM) that some of the largest computer 
makers had forced Intel to halt plans to release a high end Pentium III Xeon 
processor, since the chip did not provide enough of a performance gain to 
warrant an update. On this day Intel’s stock price decreased by 3.20% from the 
previous day to $15.125. The trading volume for the day was 194,788 shares and 
the observed abnormal return was -3.398%. 
On October 2, 2000 eWeek reported (NM) on the decision by Intel to halt 
production of its Timna processor. On this date Intel’s stock price decreased by 
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10.98% from the previous day to a price of $10.125. The trading volume 
registered during the day was 369,005 shares and the observed abnormal return 
was -10.29%. 
On October 23, 2000 Electronic News reported (NM) on Intel’s disappointment 
with the alliance formed with Rambus Inc., the problems that Intel’s engineers 
were facing and the complaints about Rambus technology. On this day Intel’s 
stock price decreased by -7.29% from the previous day to $11.25. The trading 
volume registered for the day was 147,973 shares and the observed abnormal 
return was -7.73%. 
Electronic News reported (NM) on December 18, 2000 on the possible 
competition between Intel Corp. and Sun Microsystems in the market for 
personal computer microprocessors. On this day Intel’s stock price decreased by 
6.27% from the previous day to $8.40. The trading volume registered for the day 
was 168,614 shares and observed abnormal return was -5.70%. 
 
Lucent Technologies (LU) 
 
Lucent Technologies designs, develops, manufactures and provides systems 
and computer programs internationally. These systems and computer programs 
help network operators and other Internet service providers to have and offer 
Internet access via cable or wireless. For the trimester ended on December 30, 
2000 the company net income (loss) was ($484). Sales for Lucent were $7.172 
billion, mainly due to an increase in sales of its computer program “System for 
Network Operators” one of the company’s most demanded and successful 
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product. The highest share price observed during the studied period was 
$132.125 (Apr. 1, 1998) and the lowest share price registered during the same 
period was $13.125 (Dec. 28, 2000). The average daily trading volume for 
Lucent’s stock was 12,464,879. The highest level of trading volume during the 
period studied was 178.6 million shares and the lowest trading volume for the 
same period was 592,700 shares. 
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The stock market capitalization for Lucent’s shares was $45.688 billion, the 
highest market capitalization observed for the company during the period studied 
was $86.556 billion. The company had 3.384 billion stocks outstanding at the end 
of the year 2000. Lucent’s stock had a beta of 1.56968 for the year 1998, a beta 
of 1.182399 for the year 1999 and a beta of 1.36423 for the year 2000. The 
company book value for its shares was $4.07 and its P/E ratio was 96.42. Lucent 
had total assets at the end of the year 2000 of $48.792 billion, total sales of 
$7.172 billion, the return on assets for the company was (.090%) and the return 
on equity was (1.84%) and the (EPS) was ($0.14) for the same period. The 
financial figures for the year ended on December 30, 2000 were: expenditures 
$8.728 billion, total sales of $28.904 billion, pretax income of $2.357 billion, and 
net income of $1.219 billion, the company’s ROA and ROE for the same period 
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were 2.49% and 4.66% respectively. The investment firm Lehman Brothers and 
AG Edwards had given the company’s stock a “Buy” recommendation during the 
period studied. The movement of the stocks volume, price and returns given 
different news was as follows. 
On September 8, 1998 it was reported (RD) in different news sources that Lucent 
had developed a new technology that could increase a wireless network capacity 
between 10-20 times. On the day of the announcement Lucent’s stock price 
increased to $81.50, the trading volume for the day was 10,878,700 and the 
abnormal return observed during the day was 3.67%. 
On December 21, 1998 it was reported (NF) on the Wall Street Journal that 
Motorola, a company mainly dedicated to the production of cellular phones, was 
planning on buying Lucent’s division dedicated to the development of cellular 
phones. Analysts estimated that Motorola would pay around $150 million to 
Lucent. On that day Lucent’s stock price increased to $103.875, the trading 
volume registered during the day was 7,015,300 and the abnormal return 
observed was 5.21%. 
As mentioned before it is usual that the price of the stock of a company being 
acquired increases in price, this appears to be the case in this example. On 
January 13, 1999 it was reported (NF) in the Wall Street Journal that Lucent was 
planning to acquire Kenan Systems for $1.5 billion. The company used to 
produce and develop billing software. On this day Lucent’s stock price decreased 
from $107.875 to $104.25, the trading volume observed during the day was 
22,850,000 shares and the abnormal return observed was -2.37% 
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In this case the trading volume for the day increased by nearly 15,000,000 
shares from the previous day. Apparently investors did not see the investment as 
very beneficial to Lucent’s future. On July 26, 1999 Computer Reseller News 
reported (NF) that Lucent had acquired Nexabit for $900 million. Lucent’s stock 
price decreased to $64.625, the trading volume for the day was 15,300,699 
shares and the abnormal return observed was -2.20%. 
On October 26, 1999 the Wall Street Journal reported (RD) that Lucent had 
signed a treaty with Empresa Brasileira de Telecomunicacoes to develop and 
build a multiservice network in Brazil. Lucent’s share price increased during this 
day from $59.875 to $62.875, the trading volume registered during the day was 
24,152,592 shares, more than 6,000,000 shares over the previous trading 
volume. The abnormal return registered during this day was 4.82%. 
Electronic News reported (NM) on January 10, 2000 the selling of Wildwire ADSL 
modem chip to Hewlett-Packard Co. by Lucent, to be used in the Pavilion 
consumer microcomputers. On this day Lucent’s stock price increased by 7.67% 
from the previous day to $$57.875. the trading volume for the day was 
62,328,896 shares and the observed abnormal return was 5.34%. 
Info World reported (RD) on April 17, 2000 about the plan of Lucent 
Technologies and TeraBeam networks to develop and deploy TeraBeam’s 
wireless service. On this day Lucent’s share price increased by 3.56% from the 
previous day to $54.50, the trading volume registered during the day was 
20,027,392 shares and the abnormal return observed was 4.611%. 
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On October 16, 2000 it was reported (NF) in Wireless Week about the profit 
warnings for the third quarter issued by Lucent, the decline of operating earnings 
by the company and the impact these news could have on the company stock. 
On this day the company share price decreased by 4.30% to $22.25. The trading 
volume registered for the day was 20,629,488 shares and the observed 
abnormal return was -4.83%. 
Electronic News reported (HR) on November 13, 2000 that Lucent had fired an 
undisclosed amount of employees. On this date Lucent’s stock price increased 
by 45 from the previous day to $22.75. The trading volume registered for the day 
was 18,546,192 shares and the observed abnormal return was 5.48%. 
On December 11, 2000 Electronic News reported (RD) on the letter of intent 
signed by AT&T Wireless Services, Ericsson, Lucent, Nokia, and Nortel 
Networks to develop and install the first third generation wireless infrastructure in 
the United States. On this day Lucent’s share price increased by 8.09% from the 
previous day to $16.6875. The trading volume registered for the day was 
33,169,700 and the observed abnormal return was 6.20%. 
 
Microsoft Corporation (MSFT)  
 
Microsoft Corporation, company stock ticker MSFT, develops and manufactures 
a wide array of computer software and products. They are the creators of 
Windows and all the applications of its operating system. For the trimester ended 
on December 30 2000, Microsoft’s net income was $2.409 billion. This was as a 
result of an expected increase in the sales of Windows Office. The highest share 
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price registered during the period studied was $179.9375 (Mar. 25, 1999) and the 
lowest stock price observed for the same period was $41.50 (Dec 20, 2000). The 
average daily trading volume during the period studied was 26,966,079 million 
shares. The highest level of trading volume registered for Microsoft’s shares 
during the period studied was 167,728,713 million shares (Dec. 15, 2000) and 
the lowest level of trading volume for the same period was 3,648,487 shares 
(Dec. 24, 1998). 
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Microsoft had a stock beta of 1.01325 for the year 1998, a beta of 0.94086 for the 
year 1999 and a beta of 0.6547 for the year 2000. The market capitalization of 
Microsoft’s shares was $229.150 billion, the highest market capitalization 
between 1998 and the year 2000 was $916.023 billion. The company had 5.283 
billion outstanding shares and the company stock had a book value of $5.37, at 
the end of the year 2000. The Price-Earnings ratio for the company was 94.29. 
Microsoft total assets at the end of the year 2000 were $52.150 billion and total 
sales of $5.804 billion. The company had a return on assets (ROA) of 4.62%, a 
return on equity (ROE) of 5.82% and (EPS) of $0.44 for the same period. The 
total amounts for the year ended on December 30, 2000 were $8.948 billion in 
expenditures, total sales of $22.956 billion, pretax income of 414.275 billion and 
net income of $9.421 billion. The ROA and ROE for the same period were 
18.06% and 22.77% respectively. Even though Microsoft at the time of the study, 
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was a solid company financially, it left a lot of room for investors’ speculation due 
to the legal problems Microsoft was facing at the time, as the company was being 
accused by the federal government of having a monopoly with its operating 
system, Windows. It seemed that many investors were buying the stock 
expecting the price to rise to higher levels once the legal problems were 
resolved. Microsoft’s shares were given a “Strong Buy” recommendation by the 
investments firms SG Cowen and Prudential Securities. The changes of stock 
prices, returns and volume given specific company news were as follow. 
On January 12, 1999 different news sources reported (NF) that Microsoft would 
buy 1.75 million shares from Banyan Systems, for $10 million. Both companies 
would work together in the development of new software. Microsoft’s share price 
decreased to $142.1875, the trading volume for the day was 14,565,268 and the 
abnormal return observed was -3.224%. 
On April 19, 1999 different news sources reported (NF) that Microsoft was 
planning to invest $60 million in NorthPoint, an Internet access provider 
company. NorthPoint had businesses in 17 states in the U.S. Microsoft’s share 
price decreased to $81 during the day, the trading volume registered for this date 
was 38,429,941 shares. The abnormal return observed was -6.18%. 
The Wall Street Journal reported (NF) on July 20, 1999 that Microsoft was 
planning to sell Sidewalk, a city map and city addresses provider on the Internet, 
to Ticket Master. On this date Microsoft’s share price fell to $93.3125, the trading 
volume registered for the day was 46,608,196 and the abnormal return observed 
during the day was -4.26%. 
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On September 23, 1999 different news sources announced (NF) the expected 
first public offering of Expedia.com, an Internet travel agent services provider. 
The expected revenue for Expedia was $75 million annually. Microsoft at that 
time was the owner of 80% of Expedia’s shares. On that day Microsoft’s shares 
decreased to $91.1875, and the trading volume for the stock was 35,720,412 
shares. The abnormal return observed was -4.26%. 
Other news sources reported a worry on the part of the investors as to what 
would be the effect on Microsoft’s future if Expedia.com was not successful. This 
could be the cause for the decrease in price experienced by Microsoft’s shares 
during this day. The Wall Street Journal reported (NM) on January 26, 2000 that 
Sun Microsystems was set to unveil its version of the server operating system 
Solaris 8. The article also commented on the expected favorable ruling by a 
United States District Court Judge in favor of Sun Microsystems on a lawsuit 
against Microsoft. On this day Microsoft’s stock price decreased by 3.34%from 
the previous day to $99.375. The trading volume registered for the day was 
25,084,165 shares and the observed abnormal return was -3.795%. 
On March 9, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (NF) on a contract that was 
awarded to Microsoft for their services from Mega Pixel Corp, the details of the 
deal were not disclosed. On this day, Microsoft’ share price increased by 4.64% 
from the previous day to $99.375. The trading volume registered for the day was 
44,519,308 shares and the abnormal return observed was 3.58%. 
On March 23, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (RD) that Thalia products 
division of Sunbeam Corp., a domestic appliance producer, was joining a 
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consortium led by Microsoft in order to develop standards so that small 
appliances could communicate with each other. On this day Microsoft’s stock 
price increased by 8.35% from the previous day to a price of $111.875. The 
trading volume registered for the day was 74,881,403 shares and the abnormal 
return observed during the day was 7.73%. 
Fortune magazine reported (NM) on April 3, 2000 on the possible troubles 
Microsoft could face with the introduction of a videogame machine named X-box, 
and how the authors consider this is an act of weakness presented by Microsoft. 
On this day Microsoft’s share price decreased by 14.47% from the previous day 
to $90.875. The trading volume for the day was 132,327,594 shares and the 
observed abnormal return for the day was -13.125%. 
The trading volume for the day was alarmingly high, probably indicating the 
discontent that investor had for Microsoft venturing into the gaming consoles 
industry. This industry had been dominated for year by companies like Nintendo 
and Sony (Playstation), and Microsoft had no experienced in this area of 
business, making the move to be perceived by investors as a high risk. On April 
24, 2000 Info World reported (NM) on the accusations made by the Computer 
and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) of Microsoft for using its 
Windows 2000 product to dominate the server and computer network markets. 
On this day Microsoft’s share price decreased by 15.59% from the previous day 
to a price of $66.625. The trading volume for the day was 158,203,092 shares 
and the abnormal return observed during the day was -14.646%. 
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On May 2, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (NM) that the restrictions that 
the United States Government was seeking to impose on Microsoft could 
threaten a generation of the software company’s Windows operating system. On 
this day Microsoft’s share price decreased from $73.4375 to $69.875. The 
trading volume registered for the day was 49,455,459 shares and the observed 
abnormal return was -4.504%. 
PC Magazine reported (NM) on June 6, 2000 as their gadget of the month, the 
Microsoft pocket PC hand held computer, and compared the product to the Palm 
line of personal digital assistants. On this day Microsoft’s stock price increased 
by 4.11% from the previous day to $69.625. The trading volume registered for 
the day was 50,216,509 shares and the observed abnormal return was 3.73%. 
On October 20, 2000 the Wall Street Journal reported (NF) how Microsoft’s 
positive financial numbers helped the recovery of the NASDAQ index in the 
United States. On this day Microsoft’s share price increased by 5.35% from the 
previous day to $65.1875. The trading volume for the day was 81,219,821 shares 
and the observed abnormal return was 4.27%. 
 
Siebel Systems Inc. (SEBL) 
 
Siebel Systems develops, designs and sells programming systems for marketing 
and information management. The company provides these products to 
businesses specialized in marketing, customer service, telemarketing, Internet 
marketing, and also provides consulting services on the areas mentioned before, 
to small businesses. Siebel has strategic alliances with IBM and Lucent 
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Technologies. Analyst contemplated the idea, during the period studied, that the 
strategic alliance with IBM could increase Siebel’s sales by 20%. The company’s 
stock was given a “Strong Buy” recommendation by Bank of America Securities 
and SG Cowen. For the trimester ended on December 30, 2000 the company’s 
net income was $79.484 million. The company attained this amount due to an 
increment in the program licenses sold to new customers. These increases also 
reflect that the company no longer had to pay $13.5 million in costs related to a 
past merger. The stock price reached its highest level during the period studied 
of $197.8125 on Aug. 31, 2000, a market capitalization at this time of $83.325 
billion, and its lowest share price during this period was $16.5625 on Oct. 8, 
1998. The company stock had an average daily trading volume of 2,948,330 
shares. The highest level of trading volume observed during this period was 
38,486,262 shares (Aug. 4, 2000) and the lowest level of trading volume 
registered during this period was 91,397 shares (Jan. 2, 1998).  
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The company stock beta for the year 1998 was 1.85499, the beta for the year 
1999 was 1.50829 and for the year 2000 the company stock beta was 1.63075. 
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The market capitalization for Siebel’s shares was $29.16 billion and the company 
had 442.392 million shares outstanding at the end of the year 2000. The 
company stock book value was $4.59 and its P/E ratio was 375.69. Siebel had 
total assets of $2.161 billion, total sales of $581.63 million, the return on assets 
for Siebel was 3.67%, the return on equity was 6.20% and the (EPS) was $0.15 
during the last quarter of the year 2000. The financial numbers for the year 
ended on December 30, 2000 were: expenditures of $992.57 million, total sales 
of $1.795 billion, pretax income of $384.41 million, and net income of $221.899 
million. The ROA and ROE during the same period were 10.26% and 17.33% 
respectively.. Let’s see the changes in stock price, return and volume for this 
company. 
On March 9, 1998 it was reported (NF) on different news sources that Siebel 
would acquire Scopus technologies for 7.3 times the revenue Scopus generated. 
On this day the company’s share price decreased by 4.318% from the previous 
day to $52.625. The trading volume registered for the day was 873,495 shares 
and the observed abnormal return was -4.188%. 
On September 25, 1998 different news sources reported (NM) that Siebel (Sebl) 
could face competition from SAP a German company dedicated to programming 
and software development directed towards point of sales activities. Officials 
from Sebl stated that SAP did not represent a direct threat to the company. That 
day, Sebl’s stock price fell from $26.375 to $25.25, the trading volume registered 
was 904,913 shares and the abnormal return observed was -6.17%. 
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Information Week reported (NF) on December 14, 1998 that Sebl would unite 
their client service division with Sequent Computer Services. On this date Sebl’s 
stock price decreased to $25.5625, the registered trading volume for the day was 
493,243 shares and the abnormal return observed was -1.08%. 
On April 6, 1999 it was reported (NF) in Forbes magazine that the expenditures 
of technology and software companies had increased from $320.9 billion to 
$352.7 billion. Sebl was mentioned in the article. The company stock price 
decreased from $44 to $41.50, the trading volume registered for the day was 
1,927,158 and the abnormal return observed was -5.30%. 
On July 19, 1999 it was reported in Information Week (NF) that Great Plains 
software had hired Sebl to update all their marketing systems, client services and 
Internet sales services. On this day Sebl’s stock price increased from $61.3125 
to $63.50, the trading volume registered during the day was 1,598,938 and the 
abnormal return observed was 3.34%. 
This contract was very important to Sebl since Great Plains Software was one of 
the most important software companies in middle United States. On June 5, 2000 
it was reported (NM) by Interactive Week on a partnership agreement signed by 
Sebl and Quintus. On this date Sebl stock price decreased by 5.173% from the 
previous day to $131.75. The trading volume registered for the day was 
4,308,930 shares and the observed abnormal return was -6.77%. 
Interactive Week reported (NF) on June 19, 2000 a list of the top 50 computer 
and technology companies in the United States with their corresponding growth 
in revenue and operating income, Sebl was one of the companies included in the 
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list. On this day the stock price increased by 7.08% from the previous day to 
$168.1875. The trading volume for the day was 3,255,249 shares and the 
abnormal return observed was 6.25%. 
 
Sun Microsystems Inc. (SUNW) 
 
Sun Microsystems was the most important supplier of network products for 
business computers, which included: work stations, servers, software, 
microprocessors as well as maintenance service and consulting services 
concerning the products mentioned. The highest share price attained by Sun 
Microsystems during the period studied was $146.50 (Dec. 6, 1999) and the 
lowest share price observed during the same period was $26.9375 (Dec. 19, 
2000). The average daily volume for Sun Microsystems’ shares during the period 
studied was 13,300,438 million shares. The highest level of trading volume 
observed during this period was 154,507,466 million shares (Dec. 11, 2000) and 
the lowest registered level of trading volume was 1,330,396 million shares (Dec. 
24, 1998).  
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The market capitalization for Sun Microsystems’ shares during the period studied 
was $44.516 billion and the company had 1.597 billion shares outstanding during 
the same period. The highest market capitalization for Sun between the year 
1998 and 2000 was $255 billion. The net income at the end of the quarter ended 
in December 2000 was $720 million. The company’s stock book value was $3.40 
and its P/E ratio was 60.59. Sun Microsystems’ had total assets at the end of the 
year 2000 of $14.152 billion, total sales of $5.016 billion, return on assets during 
the period studied was 5.08%, the return on equity was 9.86% and the (EPS) 
was $0.43. For the year ended on December 30, 2000 Sun Microsystems 
financial figures were as follows, expenditures of $5.767 billion, total sales of 
$15.721 billion, pretax income of $2.771 billion and net income of $1.854 billion. 
Sun’s ROA and ROE for the same period was 13.10% and 25.36% respectively. 
The company’s stock beta was 1.08099 for the year 1998, for the year 1999 the 
beta was 1.2859 and for the year 2000 the company stock beta was 0.98329. 
Sun’s company shares had a “Buy” recommendation given by the investment 
firms Paine Webber and Bank of America Securities. The impact of news over 
stock price, returns and volume was as follows. 
On January 19, 1999 the New York Times reported (RD) that Sony and Phillips 
had reach an agreement with Sun Microsystems (Sun) to develop a system 
network to allow home appliances to communicate between each other. On this 
day Sun’s stock price increased by 4.85% to $105.31. The trading volume for the 
day was 7,039,213 shares and the abnormal return observed was 3.64%. 
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On January 25, 1999 The Wall Street Journal reported (NF) that Sun’s income 
had increased by 75%, from the previous year, surpassing investors’ 
expectations. Sun’s revenue also increased, by 22%. On this day the company 
stock price increased by 3.12% to $101.06. The trading volume for the day was 
6,728,639 shares and the abnormal return observed was 2.67%. 
PC Week reported (RD) on June 21, 1999 that Motorola had signed an 
agreement with Sun, to construct a network that would improve Motorola’s 
wireless infrastructure. The company stock price increased by 7.02%. The 
trading volume for the day was 10,435,425 shares and the abnormal return 
observed was 6.20%. 
On September 3, 1999 American Banker reported (NF) that Sun would try to 
acquire Star Division Corp. Sun would try to change the way that emails, 
electronic worksheets and other computer programs are used. According to the 
article the company would try to make such programs more efficient and user 
friendly. Sun’s company stock price increased to $84.50. The trading volume for 
the day was 8,704,331 shares and the abnormal return observed was 4.349%. 
On September 27, 1999 Computer Reseller News reported (RD) that Sun and 
Microsoft had joined forces in order to develop their systems applications and 
make tem compatible. Sun’s company stock price increased by 4.158%, the 
trading volume for the day was 11,481,570 and the abnormal return observed for 
the day was 3.29%. 
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On January 31, 2000 InfoWorld reported (NM) that Sun would make the Solaris 8 
operating system’s source code for free, giving its customers more freedom to 
customize the operating system. On this date Sun’ stock price increased by 
4.66% from the previous day to $78.5625. The trading volume registered for the 
day was 18,593,642 shares and the abnormal return observed was 4.96%. 
PC Week reported (NM) on April 10, 2000 that a statement made by Sun’s 
officials about the guilty verdict in the trial of Microsoft revealed Sun’s weak 
competitive strategies, and it also commented on the impact the verdict could 
have on Sun’s production plans. On this day Sun’ stock price decreased by 
7.90% from the previous day to $91. The registered trading volume for the day 
was 19,281,403 shares and the observed abnormal return was -6.45%. 
On April 17, 2000 InfoWorld reported (NM) on the company created by CMGI, 
Novell Inc and Sun Microsystems. The company would be named CMGion and 
would build data centers and a hosting network. On this day Sun’s stock price 
increased by 10.94% from the previous day to $84.75. The trading volume 
registered for the day was 41,165,239 shares and the abnormal return observed 
during the day was 11.65%. 
On June 19, 2000 InfoWorld reported (NM) that Sun unveiled plans to enter the 
rapidly growing network storage market. On this date Sun’s stock price increased 
by 4.51% to $95.43. The trading volume registered for the day was 12,153,022 
shares and the observed abnormal return was 3.98%.  
On August 7, 2000 eWeek reported (NM) on Sun’s entry into a partnership with 
Linuxcare Inc. to develop a driver that enables Sun’s Storedge T3 enterprise 
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storage devices to work with Intel’s servers. On this day Sun’s stock price 
increased by 4.80% from the previous day to $111.75. The trading volume for the 
day was 18,095,120 shares and the observed abnormal return was 3.93%. 
Different news sources reported (NM) on December 11, 2000 on the failure of 
Sun’s operating system Solaris 8 to become compatible with Linux. On this date 
Sun’s stock price decreased by 12.68% to $34. The trading volume registered 
during the day was 154,507,466 shares, and the observed abnormal return was             
-14.08%. 
 
Yahoo! Incorporated (YHOO) 
 
Yahoo! Inc is a global Internet company that offers an assortment of Internet 
services, communication, media and e-commerce to more than 100 million users 
worldwide. Yahoo! was the leading Internet search engine during the period 
studied, and it served businesses as well as individuals. The company has 
offices located in Europe, The Pacific Basin, Latin America, Canada and the 
United States. The company had strategic alliances with Hewlett Packard, 
Toshiba, Gateway, Healtheon, and Phoenix Technologies. Yahoo! reached its 
highest share price during the period studied of $475 on Jan. 3, 2000 and the 
company recorded its lowest share price during the same period of $25.625 on 
Dec. 21, 2000, an amazing decrease in less than a year. The average daily 
volume for Yahoo’s shares during the period studied was 8,326,954 shares. The 
highest trading volume level occurred on Dec. 7, 1999, and the total trading 
volume for that day was 69,006,068 million shares. The lowest level of trading 
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volume occurred on Feb. 12, 1998 and the total shares traded that day were 
568,505.  
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The market capitalization for Yahoo’s shares during the period studied was 
$16.884 billion and the company had 561.65 million shares outstanding during 
the same period. Yahoo’s highest market capitalization between the year 1998 
and the year 2000 was $126.539 billion. The book value of the stock was $2.37 
and the company P/E ratio was 176.83.  
Yahoo! had total assets at the end of 2000 of $2.269 billion, total sales of $310 
million, the return on assets for the company during this period was (4.31%), the 
return on equity during the same period was (5.157%) and the (EPS) was 
($0.17). For the year ended on December 30, 2000 Yahoo’s! financial figures 
were as follow: expenditures of $611.5 million, total sales of $1.110 billion, pretax 
income of $264.11 million and net income of $70.76 million. Yahoo’s! ROA and 
ROE for the same period were 3.11% and 3.73% respectively. The company 
shares were given a “Strong Buy” recommendation during the period studied, by 
CIBC World Markets and E*Offerings. It is interesting to point out that even with a 
low ROA and ROE compared to the other companies in the study, Yahoo posted 
the highest P/E ratio and the highest share price, clearly indicating a very 
overvalued price. Let’s take a closer look at the company’s shares price 
movements, changes in returns and volume. 
On December 15, 1998 it was reported (NM) in the Wall Street Journal that 
Yahoo would utilize a new technology that would allow its customers to access 
previously saved information, from any computer, through the Internet. On this 
day Yahoo’s share price increased by 3.50% to $198. The trading volume for the 
day was 4,109,596 shares and the abnormal return observed was 2.27%. 
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On December 28, 1998 it was reported (NF) in the Wall Street Journal Delia’s 
Inc. had seen an unprecedented increase in its sales, since it was conducting its 
selling efforts through Yahoo’s web site. On this day Yahoo’s stock price 
increased by 11.48%. The trading volume for the day was 7,651,003 shares and 
the abnormal return observed was 10.74%. 
Apparently investors saw this article as very good publicity for Yahoo, and as a 
potential for other companies doing similar businesses with Yahoo. On January 
8, 1999 it was reported (NM) in the Wall Street Journal that IBM had reached an 
agreement with Yahoo to offer a personalized service to IBM personal computer 
clients that bought their computers through Yahoo’s web site. On this day 
Yahoo’s stock price increased from $320 to $343.625. The trading volume for the 
day was 7,816,308 and the abnormal return observed was 4.52%. 
On January 13, 1999 it was published (NF) in the New York Times that Yahoo’s 
stock seemed to be overvalued, and very volatile. On this day Yahoo’s share 
price decreased from $402 to $368, the trading volume registered for the day 
was 12,333,197 and the abnormal return observed was -7.865. 
The news seemed to have caused concerns to investors causing them to sell 
Yahoo’s shares and causing the stock price to fall during the trading session. On 
January 25, 1999 it was reported (NF) in Newsbytes News Network that Fox 
News Corporation and Yahoo had reached an agreement that would allow Fox to 
feature Yahoo’s search engine on their nine news networks. On this date 
Yahoo’s stock price increased by 9.09% to $312. The trading volume registered 
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during the day as 6,232,868 shares and the abnormal return observed was 
7.8575%. 
On January 26, 1999 the New York Time reported (NM) that Fox’s and Yahoo’s 
joint venture would be announced during the Super Bowl. During the time, a 30 
second television spot during the Super Bowl use to cost $1 million, the high 
price is justified since it is the event that draws the largest television audience 
during the year in the United States. On this day Yahoo’s stock price increased 
from $312 to $351.25. The trading volume for the day was 8,418,464 shares and 
the abnormal return observed was 10.59%.  
The Wall Street Journal reported (NF) on January 27, 1999 that Yahoo would 
acquire Geocities for $3.5 billion. Yahoo’s stock price decreased during the day 
to $335.875. The trading volume during the day was 6,990,391, and the 
abnormal return observed was -4.01%. 
On March 23, 1999 it was reported in the Wall Street Journal that Yahoo would 
acquire (NF) Broadcast.com, an Internet based radio news channel. The 
company had never declared revenues. Yahoo’s share price decreased by 
5.75%, the trading volume for the day was 5,207,529 and the abnormal return 
observed was -3.579%. 
USA Today reported (NM) on March 25, 1999 that Yahoo and Microsoft would 
work together to develop a Japanese version of Carpoint, which is an Internet 
based car dealer. On this day Yahoo’s stock price increased from $160.50 to 
$179. The trading volume registered for the day was 8,239,080 and the abnormal 
return observed was 8.33%. 
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On April 28, 1999 it was reported (NM) in the New York Times that Yahoo would 
unveil a new communication system that would allow up to 10 people to 
communicate at the same time with each other via the Internet. The company 
stock price decreased from $184.50 to $173.50, the trading volume for the day 
was 4,744,742 and the abnormal return observed was -7.875%. 
The news was perceived as not beneficial to Yahoo since the service could only 
be used for up to a minute. On June 3, 1999 it was reported (NF) in the New 
York Times that Yahoo would acquire Online Anywhere for $80 million, the 
company offered Internet directory applications. Yahoo’s share price decreased 
by 5% during the day, from $142.50 to $135.375. The trading volume registered 
during the day was 7,748,879 and the abnormal return observed was -6.36%. 
On September 23, 1999 it was reported (NM) in the Wall Street Journal, that 
Yahoo was becoming an important competitor to Ebay.com, the premier auction 
site on the Internet. During this day Yahoo’s stock price experienced a decrease 
of 3.20%. The trading volume for the day was 16,729,798 and the abnormal 
return observed was 1.75%. 
Wireless Week reported (NM) on January 3, 2000 about an alliance between 
Cellmania.com and Yahoo.com to market its products. On this day Yahoo’s stock 
price increased by 9.79% from the previous day to $475. The trading volume 
registered during the day was 9,822,356 shares and the abnormal return 
observed was 8.61%. 
On April 3, 2000 Interactive Week reported (NF) on the United States Federal 
Trade Commission probe into how Yahoo! Inc. handles consumers’ data. On this 
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day Yahoo’s stock price decreased by 6.56%. The trading volume registered 
during the day was 9,799,657 shares and the observed abnormal return was -
4.82%. 
PC Week reported (NM) on April 10, 2000 on the failure of Yahoo to maximize its 
venture into the business to business electronic commerce market. On this day 
Yahoo’s stock price decreased by 6.07% from the previous day to $141.93. The 
trading volume registered for the day was 12,653,068 shares and the observed 
abnormal return was -5.065%. 
On June 26, 2000 InfoWorld reported (NM) on the entry of Yahoo in the 
corporate portal market, and the partnership between Yahoo and Tibco Software. 
On this date Yahoo stock price decreased by 4.78% from the previous day. The 
registered trading volume for the day was 11,829,851 shares and the abnormal 
return observed during the day was -5.998%. 
On September 25, 2000 Publishers Weekly reported (NM) on how 
Barnesandnoble.com (BN.com) had replaced Amazon.com as the featured 
online bookseller on Yahoo. The article also comments on the efforts by Yahoo 
and BN.com to stay competitive in the market. On this day Yahoo’s stock price 
decreased by 5.32% from the previous day to $105.50. The registered trading 
volume for the day was 5,143,820 and the observed abnormal return was -
5.718%. 
On November 20, 2000 eWeek reported (NM) on the partnership between 
Salesforce.com and Yahoo, and how it was proposed by salesforce.com to 
supply sales force automation services to Yahoo’s Small Business Center site. 
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On this day Yahoo’s stock price decreased by 4.63% from the previous day to a 
price of $48.875. The registered trading volume for the day was 9,581,331 
shares and the observed abnormal return was -3.212%. 
 
Analysis by News Categories 
 
The analysis of the news by categories will be discussed in this part of the study. 
A total of 144 relevant news events were observed and analyzed during this 
study. The distribution of the news by categories was as follows: 59 Financial 
News (NF) were observed, followed by 66 Marketing News (NM), 15 Research 
and Development News (RD) and only 3 Human Resources related news (HR).  
 
Financial News (NF) 
 
The average cumulative abnormal return for the NF news category on the day of 
the event was -0.01651, with a J1 of -2.42. The average abnormal return for the 
event date was -.02145 (see appendix B) and the average trading volume 
observed on the event date when this type of news was released was 
22,463,792 shares.  
Event 
day Avg. AR Avg. CAR J1 Avg. Vol. 
-3 0.001656 0.001656 0.069682 18396154 
-2 0.003375 0.005031 1.285372 18343259 
-1 0.000771 0.005802 0.640489 20425443 
0 -0.02145 -0.01565 -2.41356 22463792 
1 -0.00328 -0.01893 -1.3523 20393099 
2 -0.00898 -0.02791 -2.52748 17498486 
3 -0.00205 -0.02996 -7.34012 16563878 
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As it can be interpreted by the J1 test of H0, the abnormal returns are different 
from zero. Apparently the news conveyed had an impact on the returns. A higher 
volume can also be observed during and around the event date, which would 
indicate an interest on the part of the investor to the news received. It seems that 
the negative NF news outweighed the positive NF news and hence the negative 
abnormal return. 
 
Marketing News (NM) 
 
The average cumulative abnormal return observed in the NM news category was 
-0.05889 on the return of the company stock during the day of the event studied, 
the average abnormal return on the event date was -0.04049 (see appendix B) 
and the average trading volume observed for this category was 19,113,700 
shares during the event date.  
 
Event 
day Avg AR Avg CAR J1 Avg. Vol. 
-3 -0.01306 -0.01306 -0.54892 12381251 
-2 -0.00562 -0.01868 -2.49528 12361427 
-1 0.000277 -0.01841 -4.18342 16739934 
0 -0.04049 -0.05889 -2.01633 19113700 
1 -0.00276 -0.06166 -9.70744 15846832 
2 -0.0017 -0.06335 -8.91985 13989073 
3 -0.00671 -0.07006 -4.70029 12345379 
 
The NM news category has an J1 test of H0, at the moment of the event date of -
2.0163, which seems to indicate that this news category also had an impact over 
the returns, providing abnormal returns. The trading volume also rose around 
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and during the event date, which seems to indicate that investors were swayed to 
trade based on the news received. 
 
Research and Development News (RD) 
 
The average cumulative abnormal return for the news category RD was 0.02999 
on the event date. The average abnormal returns during the same date was 
0.03441 (see appendix B) and the average trading volume observed on the event 
date for this category was 18,746,724 shares. The problem encountered with this 
category as well as the HR news category, was the limited amount of news found 
for each. This could be resolved for a later study by equally weighting the news 
categories.  
 
Event 
day Avg AR Avg CAR J1 Avg. Vol. 
-3 -0.00989 -0.00989 -6.25985 13243997 
-2 -0.0057 -0.01559 -4.27391 13961154 
-1 0.011164 -0.00443 -1.2135 15368828 
0 0.034419 0.029992 8.22175 18746724 
1 0.011081 0.041073 11.25943 19213307 
2 0.002205 0.043278 11.86391 19054161 
3 -0.00574 0.037542 10.29142 14025700 
 
It is interesting to notice how the average trading volume remained relatively high 
during the event date and around the event date. The J1 test of H0 at the event 
date was 8.221, later studies should increase the sample of this news category in 
order to have more comprehensive results. 
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Human Resources News (HR) 
  
For the HR category the average cumulative abnormal return was the lowest of 
the four categories at the event date -0.00056 and the average trading volume 
for this category during the event date was 40,782,246 shares. The average 
abnormal return for this category during the event date was 0.04366 (see 
appendix B). As stated before a very limited amount of human resources news 
were found during this period. Therefore the number presented on both the CAR 
and the average CAR, as well as average trading volume, might not be 
representative, and in the future a larger sample should be taken in order to have 
more robust and clearer results.  
 
Event 
day Avg AR Avg CAR J1 Avg. Vol. 
-3 0.007674 0.007674 18.2031 11136553.67 
-2 -0.03168 -0.024 -34.2351 13853790 
-1 -0.02022 -0.04422 -104.659 13193176.33 
0 0.043666 -0.00056 -0.05221 40782426.33 
1 -0.00466 -0.00522 -44.6365 19624790 
2 -0.07875 -0.08397 -75.955 15030490 
3 -0.02703 -0.111 -1380.94 10886883 
 
As a preliminary result, excluding the before mentioned categories HR and RD, it 
seems as if Financial News and Marketing News have an impact over investors 
behavior judging from the changes in volume around the event date and at the 
moment of the news release (see appendix C), the results on cumulative 
abnormal returns, as well as the average cumulative abnormal return is 
comparable to other studies done concerning the release of corporate 
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information. In this study the size of the event window was limited to three days 
before and three days after the event date; the event window should be larger as 
to have a better understanding of the impact of the event, since it might not be 
known exactly when the event affected investors’ behavior, trading and returns. 
Another fact that the reader should take into account is that the analysis was 
done during the period of the Internet bubble, where there was a lot of noise 
affecting the prices of stocks and their returns, as well as a large “irrational 
behavior” and highly speculative behavior, on the part of investors that might 
have added more noise to the market. Although the news presented seem to 
have an impact over the returns and produced abnormal returns, this should be 
studied more in dept, as stated before by “opening” the event window, and 
standardizing the cumulative and abnormal returns for noise in the system.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions 
 
As it can be observed in the study there is an apparent although small effect of 
different news and how investors might perceive them. This should be looked 
more in dept and taking the recommendations mentioned above in order to 
improve the study results. As mentioned before although the news appeared to 
have an impact the changes in prices and returns cannot be attributed to only 
one factor, this being the news reported, given the level of noise in the market 
during the time studied and the excessive and perhaps compulsive trading 
behavior on the part of investors. Also there could have been other factors 
affecting the company stocks prices and returns that were not taken into account 
in this study. Nevertheless it would still be very interesting to recreate this study 
during the same period once again, but utilizing the recommendations given to 
see what would be the changes in results. This period is especially interesting to 
study from the point of view of investor behavior and perception of information, 
given the fact that during the second half of the 1990’s there was a boom in the 
creation of online traders available to investors. These online traders like 
Ameritrade, E-Trade, Schwab Online and others allowed average investors to 
trade directly in the market, without the guidance of a professional. The question 
that arises is, what experience do these investors have on trading in the financial 
markets? Do they have the ability to interpret correctly the financial information 
made public by corporations? If not, on what do these investors base their 
decisions to buy or sell a security and on what type of securities to invest? 
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Usually these are the type of investors that are more prone to base their 
decisions on “soft information”, rumors, analysts’ views, statements made in the 
press etc. As mentioned in the literature review given the time constraints and 
knowledge constraints that investors face, as well as the constant bombardment 
of information being received it would be really difficult to imagine that an 
average investor would be able to look at all the available information to make 
their financial decisions, therefore it is very probable that he/she will base their 
decisions on the most readily available information that they consider might 
change or affect their investments or potential gain. As discussed at the 
beginning of the study, in the field of finance we are far from a perfect model that 
can explain or predict changes in prices and returns. The prevalent view, which is 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis, leaves a lot of issues unexplained, and some of 
them, it doesn’t even take them into account. While theoretical models of efficient 
markets have their place as illustrations or characterization of an ideal world, we 
cannot maintain them in their pure form as accurate descriptors of actual 
financial markets. As we have seen from different studies, as stated before, there 
are many different factors that the current efficient market theory does not take 
into account, the most important being the investors’ psychology. It sees the 
investor as a “rational being” that always makes the best choices and utilizes all 
the information available to him/her. But as we have seen from the evidence 
available, this is far from true. If investors were fully rational, at the time of their 
investments, they would realize the extreme risks they were facing by investing in 
corporations that virtually showed no financial gains for years, instead these 
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investors focused mostly in the “potential future financial gains” they expected 
from their investments. This example is much like the actual “burst” of the sub-
prime mortgage bubble and the mortgage backed securities (MBS) subsequent 
demise, where trillions of dollars have been lost due to faulty risk assessment on 
the part of investors and institutions. If investors would have realize the real risk 
they were incurring by investing in MBS and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
(CMO’s) that were supposed to be well collateralized by mortgages, but were 
not, they surely would not have invested the large amount of capital they did in 
such specialized, highly complex and potentially risky financial instruments and 
derivatives.  It is not to say that the investors are irrational, but rather, that when 
they are face with different situations, they might act on different levels of 
rationality. Also, it’s not that the financial markets are crazy, but they contain 
quite substantial noise, so substantial that it might dominate the movements in 
the aggregate market. This is why in my opinion we should investigate in more 
dept this issue and it is of great importance to take into account what type of 
news will investor pay more attention to, because this will impact trading 
behavior, and prices, and as seen during the Internet bubble it can lead to very 
high unsustainable prices. This situation affects everyone from corporate 
managers and their timing of investment decisions, or issuing of new stocks or 
bonds, to financial planners and their asset allocation, to the everyday investor 
trying to make some additional returns in the market, and definitely to researches 
who try to look for new ways to explain the behavior of the financial market, the 
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use of better tools to explain price movements, returns and changes in the 
financial market.  
 
Conclusión 
Como se desprende de éste estudio existe un aparente, aunque pequeño, 
impacto de las noticias clasificadas por grupos, sobre el precio de los valores en 
el mercado y las decisiones de los inversores. Este impacto debe ser investigado 
más a fondo tomando en cuenta las recomendaciones mencionadas en el 
estudio. Como se menciona anteriormente aunque las diferentes categorías de 
noticias aparentan tener un impacto sobre los precios/rendimientos de los 
valores estudiados, estos cambios no deben ser atribuidos a este único factor 
dado el nivel de ruido en el mercado durante el momento histórico estudiado y el 
comportamiento de compra-venta de valores excesivo y hasta compulsivo, por 
parte de los inversores durante la “burbuja de la Internet”. También pudo haber 
otros factores que afectaron los precios y rendimientos de las acciones de 
capital, pero que no fueron tomados en cuenta en esta investigación. 
El periodo de la “burbuja de la Internet” durante los años noventa es uno muy 
interesante y de mucha utilidad para poder estudiar el comportamiento de los 
inversores y la percepción que estos tienen sobre la información presentada. Es 
muy importante el hecho de que durante la segunda mitad de la década de los 
noventa hubo una explosión en la cantidad de “online brokers” (corredores de 
valores en línea) disponibles a los inversores. Corredores en línea como 
Ameritrade, E-Trade, Schwab Online y otros, empezaron a ofrecer sus servicios 
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y ofrecer acceso directo al mercado de valores a inversores comunes, no 
necesariamente educados en métodos de inversión y sin una supervisión u 
orientación profesional. Las preguntas que deben surgir entonces son: ¿Qué 
experiencia o conocimiento tenían estos inversores acerca la compra y venta de 
valores en los mercados financieros?, ¿Tenían la habilidad estos inversores de 
interpretar correctamente la información financiera emitida por las corporaciones 
públicas y otras fuentes de información financiera? Si la respuesta es negativa, 
entonces, ¿En qué basaban sus decisiones estos inversores acerca la compra y 
venta de una acción de capital y en qué tipo de instrumentos invertir? 
Usualmente este tipo de inversor tiende a fundamentar sus decisiones lo que se 
conoce como “soft information” o información sin peso como rumores, 
recomendaciones de personas que los inversores entienden que conocen del 
mercado de valores, recomendaciones de analistas, noticias en la prensa, etc. 
Como es mencionado en el repaso de la literatura, dadas las limitaciones que 
enfrentan los inversores en cuanto al tiempo disponible para la toma de una 
decisión de invertir o no en un valor financiero y el constante bombardeo de 
información que estos inversores reciben, es algo difícil imaginar que un inversor 
promedio tenga el tiempo y la habilidad de poder analizar toda la información 
disponible sobre una acción de capital a la hora de tomar decisiones de 
inversión. Por lo tanto, es muy probable que este inversor base sus decisiones 
en la información que se le haga más fácil obtener y entender, y que estos crean 
que dicha información represente un evento que pueda afectar sus inversiones, 
trayéndoles posibles ganancias o pérdidas. 
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Como se discute al principio del estudio, el campo de las finanzas está bastante 
lejos de tener un modelo perfecto que explique y pueda predecir los cambios en 
precios y rendimientos de valores financieros. La idea prevaleciente durante 
muchos años, la Hipótesis de Mercados Eficientes (HME), deja muchos factores 
sin explicar y muchos otros se podrían mejorar. Mientras modelos teóricos de 
mercados eficientes tienen su espacio como ilustraciones o una caracterización 
de un mundo ideal, no se pueden mantener en su forma pura como una 
descripción correcta de los mercados financieros reales. Como se desprende de 
diferentes estudios discutidos en el repaso de literatura, hay diferentes factores 
que la HME no toma en cuenta, el más importante de estos factores es la 
psicología del inversor. La HME clasifica al inversor como un ente racional que 
siempre toma la decisión que optimizará su inversión, según la información 
disponible. Sin embargo, según muestra la evidencia de los estudios en la 
revisión literaria, esto no necesariamente es cierto. Si los inversores durante la 
burbuja de Internet, hubiesen sido completamente racionales, se hubiesen dado 
cuenta de los grandes riesgos que estaban incurriendo al invertir en 
corporaciones que llevaban años sin mostrar ganancias en sus estados 
financieros. Estos inversores se enfocaron en el potencial de ganancias futuras o 
esperadas de las empresas en las que invertían sin tomar en cuenta el riesgo de 
la inversión. Esto se asemeja mucho a la caída de la burbuja del mercado 
hipotecario “sub-prime” y los instrumentos financieros respaldados por hipotecas 
(mortgage backed securities, MBS), donde desaparecieron trillones de dólares a 
causa de una mala estimación por parte de los inversores del riesgo real que 
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representaban dichas inversiones e instrumentos financieros. Si los inversores 
hubiesen hecho un avalúo correcto del riesgo real al que se estaban exponiendo 
al invertir en instrumentos financieros como los MBS y los CMO (collateralized 
mortgage obligation u obligaciones hipotecarias colateralizadas), definitivamente 
no hubiesen invertido en estos instrumentos, ya que la cantidad de hipotecas 
que servían de colateral para dichos instrumentos no eran suficientes. Cabe 
señalar que la alta complejidad de estos derivados financieros hacía muy difícil 
poder evaluar correctamente su riesgo real. 
No es que los inversores no sean racionales, sino más bien, que cuando se 
presentan diferentes situaciones, los inversores actúan con diferentes grados de 
racionalidad. Y tampoco es que los mercados se comporten de una manera 
irracional, sino que como presenta Black (1986) hay mucho “ruido” en los 
mercados y esto puede afectar los movimientos generales de los mercados de 
valores. Por tal razón es importante que se investigue a fondo a que tipo (clases) 
de noticias los inversores le prestan más atención ya que esto afectara su 
comportamiento de inversión y la toma de decisiones. Según sean las 
decisiones de los inversores, se afectarán los precios de los valores financieros 
en los mercados y esto puede llevar a la creación de una burbuja de precios 
insostenibles que luego caen, tal y como sucedió durante el principio de la 
década del dos mil con la caída de la burbuja de las compañías de Internet. Esta 
situación afecta a todos los componentes y participantes de los mercados de 
valores, desde un gerente corporativo y sus decisiones de inversión o nuevas 
emisiones de bonos corporativos o acciones de capital, a un manejador de 
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fondos de inversión y la composición de activos que desee incluir en su cartera 
de inversiones, a un inversor promedio que busque obtener rendimientos 
positivos en el mercado de valores. Estudiar qué categoría de noticias tiene 
mayor peso sobre la toma de decisiones de los inversores, puede llevar a 
entender mejor los movimientos de precios en el mercado de valores financieros. 
A los investigadores les puede ser especialmente útil conocer que tipos de 
noticias afectan más la toma de decisiones de los inversores y su 
comportamiento, para crear mejores herramientas y modelos que expliquen 
mejor los movimientos de precios, rendimientos y cambios generales en los 
mercados financieros. 
 
Recommendations 
 
A series of recommendations are made for future studies. First the problem 
encountered with the RD and HR news category should be addressed as a 
limited amount of news was found for each category, and the results for these 
two categories might not be representative. This could be resolved for a later 
study by equally weighting the news categories or also a larger sample should be 
taken in order to have more robust and clearer results. Second, the size of the 
event window should be expanded in order to have a better understanding of the 
impact of the event, and it should also serve as a better fit for news impact 
results. The biggest limitation to the small window presented was that it might not 
be known exactly when the event affected investors’ behavior, trading and 
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returns. Another recommendation would be to include changes in returns smaller 
than 3% (positive or negative), this way a larger amount of news sampled would 
be useful. Although the news presented seem to have an impact over the returns 
and produced abnormal returns, this should be studied more in dept, as stated 
before by “opening” the event window, and standardizing the cumulative and 
abnormal returns for noise in the system. In order to make the difference in 
average abnormal returns be clearer, it would be a good idea to divide each 
news category by positive news and negative news, this way average returns 
would not cancel out, and the real impact would be more noticeable.  It would 
also be interesting to see what would be the outcome if the study took into 
account different international financial markets, where the expectations of the 
investors might tend to be different. Another recommendation would be to do a 
similar study, taking into account the age of the investors, since at different age 
stages the trading behavior depending on risk should be different. It would be 
interesting to see how older investors that are nearing their retirement react to 
changes differently than younger investors would. It would also be interesting for 
future studies to conduct a “controlled experiment” with graduate finance 
students and provide them with different corporate news, in order to see their 
reactions and gather their opinions on the impact the information received had on 
their behavior and perceived outcome. It would also be helpful to measure how 
different weights in compensation and changes in it are perceived by investor 
(imagery and affect)28, based on the model proposed by MacGregor, Slovic, 
                                                 
28
 Affect can be viewed as a quality assignment to a stimulus or object, such as a company or investment 
opportunity. 
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Dreman, and Berry (MSDB), on their study of Imagery, Affect and Financial 
Judgment (2000). According to these authors, word association techniques are 
strongly rooted in the history of psychology and are capable of revealing the 
cognitive and affective elements of images people hold about complex stimuli. As 
stated in the propositions the affect and imagery, or perception of the investor, 
should have a powerful effect on the judgments about performance and quality of 
securities. For future studies it would be interesting to conduct an investigation 
with a bigger scope or timeline, taking into account five or more years before the 
Internet bubble, the actual time that the bubble occurred, and five or more years 
after the bubble. This would be interesting to do in order to see what 
factors/information affected investor behavior the most, and if those same 
factors/information had the same effect after the bubble.  
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Appendix B 
Average Abnormal Returns Tables 
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Average Abnormal Returns for NM News Category 
 
 
 
 
(Vertical axis: abnormal return, horizontal axis: event date) 
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Average Abnormal Returns for RD News Category 
 
 
 
(Vertical axis: abnormal return, horizontal axis: event date) 
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Average Abnormal Returns for HR News Category 
 
 
 
(Vertical axis: abnormal return, horizontal axis: event date) 
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Appendix C 
Volume Tables by News Categories 
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 (Volume vertical axis, event date horizontal axis) 
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Volume Changes for News Category NM 
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Volume Changes for News Category RD 
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